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Considering the declining number of bankruptcy filings, and increasing out-of-court negotiations and 
debt reorganisations, we argue in favour of penalising firms for becoming sufficiently close to 
bankruptcy that they have questionable going-concern status. Thus, we propose a definition of financial 
distress contingent upon firms’ earnings, financial expenses, market value and operating cash flow. 
Subsequently, we investigate the role of tail risk measures (Value-at-risk and Expected Shortfall) in 
aggravating likelihood of financial distress. Our results show that longer horizon (three- and five-year) 
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1. Introduction 
Financial Distress and Tail Risk are two apparently diverse topics that are gaining increasing 
attention in corporate finance literature. The financial crisis of 2007-08 was the alarm bell that 
augmented global awareness toward tail risk among financial risk managers. Since then, we 
have witnessed increasing concern among stakeholders toward firms’ risk of bankruptcy or 
financial distress. Although tail risk has been an active area of investigation in the domain 
concerned with large financial institutions and financial stability, to the best of our knowledge 
this study is the first academic attempt to address the relationship between firms’ extreme 
negative daily equity returns and their likelihood of experiencing financial distress. We 
hypothesise that more frequent extreme negative daily equity returns result in higher tail risk, 
and this subsequently increases firms’ likelihood of entering financial distress.  
The vast majority of academic literature on bankruptcy prediction gravitates around 
either the choice of explanatory variables (e.g. Campbell et al. 2008, Jones 2017), or modelling 
methodologies (e.g. Shumway, 2001, Gupta et al. 2018) targeted towards optimising models’ 
classification performance. However, a model’s performance is significantly dependent on how 
the distress or bankruptcy event is defined in the first place. Unfortunately, this aspect has not 
received sufficient attention in bankruptcy literature. Moreover, legal bankruptcy filings in the 
United States are becoming an increasingly rare phenomenon,1 and this might provide false 
signals on firms’ bankruptcy likelihood to external stakeholders. Waiting until the bankruptcy 
event might lead to significant erosion in firms’ value (see Glover, 2016), losses to creditors 
and unfavourable business decisions in the years prior to the bankruptcy filing. Thus, we also 
argue for the need for an alternative mechanism to identify firms in financial difficulties, and 
penalise them for getting close to questionable going-concern status. This might be considered 
                                                 
1 Out of about 7,538 firms in our sample, between 1990 and 2016, only 216 exit the Compustat database due to 
Chapter 7/11 filings.  
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analogous to identifying the symptoms of a disease (financial distress) and starting the 
treatment, rather than waiting until the fully-grown disease (bankruptcy). This is expected to 
improve/stabilise credit pricing and minimise losses arising due to mispricing of credit risk. 
As a consequence, we propose a definition of financial distress contingent upon firms’ 
earnings, financial expenses, market value and operating cash flow. Our proposed new 
definition of financial distress essentially builds on that offered by Pindado et al. (2008), which 
is considered to be more functional than its predecessors. We define a firm as financially 
distressed if it satisfies three simple conditions: (i) there is negative growth in the average 
market value (AMV) of the firm in years t – 1 and t – 2, where AMV the is geometrically 
declining weighted average of a firm’s monthly market values over the past twelve months; (ii) 
its earnings before interest tax depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) is less than its financial 
expenses (FE) in the years t – 1 and t – 2; and (iii) its operating cash flow is less than its 
financial expenses in the years t – 1 and t – 2. 
Subsequently, we explore the information content of tail risk measures, namely Value-
at-risk (VaR) and Expected Shortfall (ES), in explaining firms’ likelihood of entering financial 
distress. Downside or tail risk measures focus only on the risk of underperforming a defined 
benchmark return and ignore the risk of outperforming the same. We consider the relationship 
between downside risk measures and financial distress for several reasons. First, there exists 
substantial literature pertaining to safety-first investors, whose objective is to minimise the 
probability of financial distress/bankruptcy. A safety-first investor’s portfolio is intended to 
maximise expected return subject to downside risk constraint (see, among others, Roy, 1952, 
Arzac and Bawa, 1977). Second, as part of efficient risk management practices, financial and 
non-financial firms are increasingly required to quantify the amount of risk their portfolio or 
assets may incur over specified time horizons. For instance, banks assess their potential losses 
in order to maintain adequate levels of buffer capital. Similarly, credit rating agencies track the 
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value of firms’ assets in order to provide them with an accurate credit rating. Finally, empirical 
evidence typically shows a skewed distribution of stock returns, with peaks around the mode 
and fat tails (see, among others, Jansen and De Vries, 1991, Conrad et al. 2013). This implies 
that occurrence of negative extreme events is more frequent than suggested by the normal 
distribution. Therefore, traditionally used measures of market risk (i.e. variance or standard 
deviation) might be insufficient to approximate the likelihood of maximum loss that a firm may 
witness under highly volatile or normal periods.2 
There is a growing literature on downside risk and expected stock returns (see, for 
example, Bali et al. 2009, Huang et al. 2012). However, we did not come across any suitable 
literature that explores the relationship between tail risk measures and financial distress. Thus, 
we explore this relationship and, in addition to proposing a definition of financial distress, we 
assess the marginal discriminatory power of tail risk measures, namely VaR and ES, in 
predicting the financial distress of publicly-traded firms in the United States. The relationship 
we explore is intertemporal as we use three-month, six-month, one-year, three-year and five-
year daily, and sixty-month monthly returns to measure the VaR and ES of all firms in our 
sample. Following Zangari (1996), Jaschke (2002) and Liang and Park (2010), we add the 
Cornish and Fisher (1938) expansion into these risk measures. Contrary to the normal 
assumption of these risk measures, the Cornish and Fisher (1938) expansion brings skewness 
and kurtosis into the equation, which is more appropriate for non-normal financial returns. We 
estimate the risk measure of each firm at the year-end to predict firms’ financial distress in the 
following year. In terms of tail risk measures, our study closely relates to Bali et al. (2009), 
who study the intertemporal relationship between tail risk and expected return, and Liang and 
                                                 
2 Empirical literature reports that VaR is reasonable in predicting catastrophic financial market events. It also 
efficiently captures the rate of occurrence of such events, including extreme cases. On the other hand, the 
traditional measures of market risk, such as standard deviation and conditional variance, provide an inaccurate 
prediction of extreme events in financial markets (Jorion, 2000, Longin, 2000,Neftci, 2000, Bali, 2003). 
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Park (2010), who explore the relationship between downside risk measures and hedge funds’ 
failure. 
We test our hypothesis using a sample of publicly-traded firms in the United States 
obtained from the Compustat database, covering an analysis period from 1990 to 2016. To 
gauge the statistical significance of respective tail risk measures in predicting likelihood of 
financial distress, we begin the empirical validation by reporting univariate regression 
estimates for them. Although tail risk measures and their respective average marginal effects 
(AME) are highly significant in predicting financial distress likelihood, VaR measures 
estimated at the 5% significance level show highest values of AME for all respective durations. 
In support of our hypothesis, the univariate regression results establish the positive relationship 
between firms’ distress likelihoods and extreme negative returns. We also test the marginal 
discriminatory power of tail risk measure in the multivariate setup. First, we develop our one-
year financial distress prediction model using panel logistic regression technique and standard 
financial ratios found significant in recent literature (e.g. Campbell et al. 2008, Gupta et al. 
2018). Next, we supplement respective tail risk measures to this baseline distress model and 
analyse its significance in the presence of other competing covariates.  
Empirical results suggest that VaR estimates over longer duration (five years) are 
significant in the multivariate setup and are superior to standard deviation as a proxy for risk 
measure (as AME of standard deviation is much lower than AME of significant VaR measures). 
ES also exhibit explanatory behaviour similar to VaR in predicting financial distress. Longer 
duration (three and five years) are significant, but unlike VaR estimates they show lower values 
of AMEs. Our results are also robust to financial distress definition of varying intensities. 
Considering the theoretical superiority of ES over VaR (see Righi and Ceretta, 2016) for 
additional discussion) we suggest using longer duration ES measures as a proxy for risk 
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measure. Finally, we find strong support for our hypothesis that firms that show more frequent 
extreme negative daily equity returns are more likely to experience the risk of financial distress. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 defines and provides the 
rationale behind our proposed definition of financial distress; Section 3 provides definitions of 
downside risk measures employed in this study; and Section 4 discusses data and financial 
covariates. Section 5 presents our empirical results; Section 6 and 7 present additional results 
on robustness checks; and Section 8 concludes this study. 
2. Defining Financial Distress 
Traditionally, most academic studies on bankruptcy prediction gravitated around the choice of 
explanatory variables and modelling methodologies targeted towards improving prediction 
models’ classification performance. However, these performances depend significantly on how 
the distress or bankruptcy event is defined in the first place. Unfortunately, this aspect has not 
received sufficient attention in the bankruptcy literature.  
The vast majority of studies employ some legal definition of bankruptcy in line with the 
relevant bankruptcy code (e.g. Chapter 7/11 filings in the United States), or legal bankruptcy 
filings supplemented with other related events, such as delisting from stock exchanges due to 
financial reasons (e.g. Shumway, 2001), or receiving below investment grade credit ratings 
(e.g. Campbell et al. 2008). Plausible reasons behind this additional use of proxy bankruptcy 
events are attributed to the lack of a standard dataset of bankruptcy events, supplemented with 
the very small frequency of such events. Since these events significantly threaten firms’ degree 
of solvency, these may be used to model firms’ default risk. However, these definitions of 
default may suffer from several noteworthy issues.3  
                                                 
3 The issues discussed in the subsequent paragraph are drawn from studies that employ sample of listed or unlisted 
firms of the Unites States, France, Germany, Hungary, United Kingdom, etc. Since, we employ a sample of the 
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Firstly, by combining all of these different forms of default, we are trying to predict the 
probability of a heterogeneous outcome variable, which may be inappropriate. Additionally, 
since events like bankruptcy resolution involve lengthy legal processes, there often exists a 
significant time gap between real/economic default date and legal default date (see 
Theodossiou 1993, Balcaen and Ooghe 2006, Tinoco and Wilson 2013).4 Moreover, these 
events are significantly affected by differences in bankruptcy codes between different 
countries, thus cross comparison of default prediction models between different countries 
might be inappropriate. Even in cases of uniform codes, instances of judicial discretion cannot 
be completely ignored where bankruptcy outcomes are often biased toward debtors or creditors 
(see Gennaioli and Rossi, 2010 for additional discussion). Additionally, differences in 
creditors’ rights also play a significant role in bankruptcy or default outcomes. Davydenko and 
Franks (2008) report large differences in creditors’ rights across France, Germany and the 
United Kingdom, leading banks to adjust their lending and reorganisation practices in an 
attempt to avoid costly proceedings of bankruptcy filings. This might lead to false impressions 
about firms’ financial health, which might otherwise have questionable going-concern value. 
A recent study by Franks and Loranth (2014) confirms that the large majority of bankrupt 
Hungarian firms in their sample were maintained as going-concerns despite these firms having 
suffered large operating losses, primarily due to varying controlling rights of creditors as per 
the Hungarian bankruptcy code. 
However, if we define financial default as debtors’ inability to honour the terms of debt 
contract (specifically failure to make payment when it is due), then this usually precedes events 
                                                 
U.S. listed firms in our study, we do not try to imply that all these issues exist or might exist in the U.S. as well. 
We merely present an exposition in support of financial distress as an appropriate default definition. 
4 To gain protection from the bankruptcy code, in the U.S., firms usually file for Chapter 11 before they actually 
default on a significant debt obligation. This gives them the opportunity to renegotiate the outstanding debt 
obligation or related credit terms with its creditors. However, this may cause significant cost to creditors in the 
form of administration/recovery cost, subsidised loan, partial loan waiver, etc. Thus, if lenders can identify the 
timing of economic default or financial distress (which usually precedes legal default), they may undertake pre-
emptive measures to minimise subsequent costs arising in the event of any bankruptcy litigation. 
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such as legal bankruptcy filing, delisting, or rating downgrade. Frequent occurrence of financial 
default events might lead to a state of financial distress, where a firm’s going-concern aspect 
is seriously threatened. Once a firm is financially distressed, it may opt for formal 
reorganisation involving the court system, or an informal reorganisation through the market 
participants (see John et al. 2013 for a comparative discussion). Debt restructuring, asset sale 
and infusion of new capital from external sources are the three most commonly used market-
based or private methods of resolving financial distress (Senbet and Wang, 2010). Debt 
restructuring allows a financially distressed firm to renegotiate the outstanding debt obligation 
or related credit terms with its creditors, but is critically subject to whether the debt obligation 
is due to private or public entity.  
As an alternative to this, a distressed firm may sell off some of its existing assets to reduce 
its outstanding liability, or may undertake new profitable investment opportunities, which may 
eventually help it to overcome its misery. Despite having profitable investment opportunities, 
a financially distressed firm might not be able to generate additional funding, due to the high 
risk involved in financing distressed firms and the ‘debt overhang’ problem as discussed by 
Myers (1977). As a consequence, infusion of new capital through informal reorganisation 
involving market participants is rarely observed in the resolution of financial distress.5 Thus, 
we cannot rule out the possibility that a financially distressed firm may not file for Chapter 7 
or Chapter 11 protection and, instead, choose a private workout method for resolving financial 
distress. 
                                                 
5 However, in case of a formal reorganisation involving the court system, new debt financing may be made 
available through the debtor-in-possession (DIP) provision intended to encourage new lending to firms in 
bankruptcy reorganisation. Once a firm files for bankruptcy, the DIP provision allows the financially distressed 
firm to avail new debt financing usually on a seniority basis (violating any absolute priority rule by placing the 
new financing ahead of the firm’s existing debts for payment). 
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 Gilson et al. (1990) and Gilson (1997) report that firms avoid legal bankruptcy processes 
by out-of-court negotiation with creditors. However, it should be noted that such out-of-court 
negotiations are nearly impossible if the firm under formal restructuring has any public debt. 
Thus, under the binary classification based on legal consequences, a financially distressed firm 
which has not filed for Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 is not considered to have questionable going-
concern value. There is, therefore, a clear need for an ex-ante mechanism to identify firms 
vulnerable to bankruptcy risk in the near future. Waiting until the bankruptcy event might lead 
to significant erosion in firms’ value, losses to creditors and unfavourable business decisions 
in the years prior to the bankruptcy filing year. It is in the interest of most stakeholders to raise 
the flag when the symptoms of financial distress are visible, in order to avoid or prepare for the 
forthcoming crisis. In this regard, lending or credit decisions based on firms’ financial distress 
likelihood may be more relevant in addressing respective stakeholders’ objectives. 
Moreover, from the literature pertaining to bankruptcy costs, we understand that indirect 
costs of bankruptcy (which are generally in the form of opportunity costs) usually precede 
direct costs (including legal and liquidation expenses). Thus, leading to declining degrees of 
solvency much before the actual bankruptcy filing event date. This is in line with the theoretical 
arguments of Purnanandam (2008), who suggests that financial distress is a state in which firms 
are unable to meet their debt obligations, ultimately leading them to insolvency as the debt 
matures. Prominent signs of indirect costs include loss of valuable employees, restrictive terms 
of trade credit and decline in consumer confidence and investment growth, which, over time, 
may lead to significant loss in market value even if the firm never files for legal bankruptcy 
(Chen and Merville, 1999). Thus, a financially distressed firm is left with the challenge of 
persuading employees, customers, suppliers and trade creditors to engage in business with it. 
The closer to bankruptcy a firm is, the stronger this challenge becomes. Stakeholders begin 
abandoning distressed firms, leading to even faster depletion of operating profits and 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2847422 
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shareholder wealth. Thus, rather than considering a firm bankrupt when it files for legal 
bankruptcy, it is appropriate to penalise it for being sufficiently close to bankruptcy/default for 
their going-concern status to become questionable. 
One might argue the economic rationale for imposing this additional cost on firms, which 
apparently seems to be counterproductive. However, we know that a penalty on rash driving is 
expected to make drivers more careful, which, in turn, is expected to reduce the number of 
accidents and, thus, reduce the overall cost associated with such accidents. Similarly, if a firm 
is penalised for approaching financial distress in the form of higher cost of credit, reduced 
access to credit or receiving simply a warning bell, the firm may be more mindful towards its 
deteriorating financial conditions and take proactive measures to avoid potential costly 
bankruptcy.6 Penalising firms for approaching financial distress will add additional marginal 
cost to these firms, but it is expected to reduce cost to other stakeholders (lenders, judiciary, 
trade creditors, etc.). 
Through this, to an extent, we try to imply that the threat of a penalty would decrease the 
likelihood of firms entering financial distress and eventually bankruptcy. However, we cannot 
rule out the possibility of firms filing for bankruptcy to gain strategic advantage. Gupta and 
Barzotto (2018) report evidence of strategic bankruptcy resolution among large corporations 
in the United States and argue that firms evaluate their likelihood of emerging from Chapter 
11 bankruptcy filings before make filing decisions.  
Considering the discussion above, we believe that financial distress is practically more 
relevant than legal bankruptcy events and, in the following discussion, we propose a new 
definition of financial distress that builds on suggestions and findings from earlier related 
                                                 
6 Through this statement we do not imply that lenders are currently unable to assess credit risk and aren’t imposing 
higher costs of credit to riskier borrowers. We rather suggest that our proposed definition of financial distress will 
aid them in better assessment and pricing of credit risk.   
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studies. In this study, we define a firm as financially distressed in the year t if it satisfies the 
following three conditions in years t – 1 and t – 2: 
Condition 1: There is negative growth in the average market value (AMV) of the firm in 
years t – 1 and t – 2. Where, AMV is the geometrically declining weighted average of a firm’s 




(𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝜑𝑀𝑉𝑡−2 +  … … … …  𝜑
11𝑀𝑉𝑡−12)             (1) 
Here, 𝜑 = 2− 
1
3, implying that the weight is halved each month. To avoid losing 
observations, missing values are replaced with AMV computed using the available number of 
observations at time t. 
Although decline in firms’ market value in two consecutive time periods has been 
suggested in past literature (e.g. Pindado et al. 2008), we suggest considering the average 
market value rather than the end of the analysis year market value, as the latter represents a 
static snapshot of a firm’s market capitalisation at the end of a given trading day, which may 
be significantly influenced by negative or positive developments around that trading day. Thus, 
instead of market value on a given day, we use AMV, as it is a better representation of the 
average state of a firm. Further, by imposing geometrically declining weighted average in 
Equation 1, we impose higher weight to more recent observations similar to Campbell et al. 
(2008) so that our average is not flawed/biased by rapid growths or declines in firms’ monthly 
market values.  
Condition 2: the firm’s earnings before interest tax depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) 
is less than financial expenses (FE) in the years t – 1 and t – 2. 
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Traditionally, excessive leverage is believed to be the primary cause of bankruptcy or 
financial difficulties (e.g. John et al. 2013), however significant volumes of literature argue 
that firms with a higher cost of default choose a lower level of leverage to mitigate potential 
default likelihood (e.g. George and Hwang, 2010, Glover, 2016), and, thus, we cannot rule out 
the possibility of financial distress triggered by reasons other than leverage. By including a 
condition on firms’ ability to meet their financial expenses, we are essentially trying to capture 
those firms that enter into financial difficulties due to their inability to meet financial 
commitments to the providers of debt capital. Pindado et al. (2008) also suggest that financially 
distressed firms should report financial expenses higher than their earnings in two consecutive 
years. This effectively implies that the ratio between earnings to financial expenses should be 
less than one in these two time periods.  
Condition 3: the firm’s operating cash flow (OCF) is less than its financial expenses in the 
years t – 1 and t – 2. 
If we define financial default as debtors’ inability to make payment when it is due, then 
cash flow is of prime importance. Since the adoption of an accrual accounting system for 
recording and reporting business transactions, balance sheets and income statements have 
emerged as dominant sources of information for business decision-making. However, accruals 
are the non-cash component of earnings and represent adjustments made to cash flows to 
generate a profit measure largely unaffected by the timing of receipts and payments of cash 
(Ball et al. 2016). Thus, just having earnings above financial expenses (EBITDA > IE or 
EBITDA/IE > 1) does not guarantee a firm’s ability to repay its debt on time. Inefficient 
management of cash may also result in premature closure of even profitable businesses, as 
loans, most operating expenses, taxes etc. are required to be paid in cash. However, this 
important cash flow information is often overlooked in the academic literature. For instance, 
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Pindado et al. (2008) and Keasey et al. (2015) did not consider the role of cash flow information 
while defining financial distress. 
Ball et al. (2016) argue that cash-based measures of operating profitability (a measure 
that excludes accruals) outperform measures of profitability that include accruals. Additionally, 
Grullon et al. (2017) report that, for large firms, cash flow remains the primary driver of 
investment spending and the marginal effect of cash flow on aggregate investment has actually 
increased over the past 30 years. Recent literature also highlights the importance of financing 
constraints and free-cash-flow problems in making sound investment decisions (Lewellen and 
Lewellen, 2016). The relative importance of cash flow in times of financial distress is also 
realised in recent literature. Lee et al. (2016) argue that, in times of financial distress, investors 
place significantly higher weight on OCF information than on earnings information, as they 
find that a firm’s stock returns show stronger association with its OCF than its earnings when 
the firm is in financial distress. Considering the discussion above, and to be consistent with the 
two previous conditions, we include Condition 3 in our proposed definition of financial 
distress, with an aim to overcome some of the limitations of firms’ failure definitions discussed 
earlier.  
3. Estimating Downside Risk Measures 
We use daily three-month, six-month, one-year, three-year, five-year and monthly sixty-month 
returns to measure VaR and ES of all firms in our sample. We estimate the risk measure of 
each firm as of the month-end (of the latest available daily/monthly return data) in a given year 
to predict firms’ financial distress in the next year. For instance, if the date on which financial 
statements were filed is June 2015, we calculate its risk measures as of May 2015 to predict a 
firm’s financial distress likelihood in the next one year. 
Value-at-risk: Estimation of VaR requires the definition of two basic parameters, the 
confidence level (1 − 𝛼) and the time horizon (τ), along with the estimation model. These are 
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then used to estimate the worst loss that may occur over the specified time horizon and 
confidence level.  
Traditionally, the risk horizon is measured in the number of trading days,7 rather than the 
number of calendar days for measuring VaR, and it is this period over which we measure the 
expected loss. In the absence of any defined rules or guidelines, time horizon is usually chosen 
by considering the liquidity of the risk and the duration of exposure to that risk (Alexander, 
2008). The higher the assets’ liquidity, the lower the time required to close or fully hedge the 
exposure. Thus, the time horizon required is shorter for the VaR model. A longer time horizon 
is suggested when measuring VaR in stressful and volatile market conditions, as markets tend 
to lose liquidity during such economic conditions. Credit rating agencies assign top ratings to 
those companies that exhibit extremely low default probability (such as 0.03%) over the next 
one-year horizon. Hence, companies looking for AA or above credit rating should apply a 
confidence level of 99.97% to measure their enterprise-wide VaR over the next one-year 
horizon. Considering the arguments presented above, and the nature of our application, we 
estimate downside risk measures using five different time horizons to detect the presence of 
any intertemporal differences. We estimate the risk measure of each firm as of the year-end 
using the past three-month, six-month, twelve-month, three-years and five-years daily returns, 
and past five-year monthly returns to predict firms’ financial distress the following year. 
The choice of confidence level is also highly subjective; it primarily depends on the area 
of application and users’ attitude towards risk. For instance, the Basel II Accord requires banks 
using internal VaR models to assess their capital requirements to measure VaR at a 99% 
confidence level, while a credit rating agency may maintain a more stringent confidence level 
of about 99.97% to assess the probability of firms’ insolvency hazard (Jorion, 2000). On the 
                                                 
7 In this study, our risk estimates are computed using 252 trading days in a year. 
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other hand, a risk manager may allow a lower confidence level (95%) and shorter risk horizon 
(1 day) while setting VaR based trading limits. Thus, we consider two different loss probability 
levels, namely 99% (𝛼 = 0.01) and 95% (𝛼 = 0.05) confidence levels, to estimate the 
downside risk measures. 
Let τ denote the time horizon, 𝑅𝑡+𝜏 denote a firm’s return between the time period t and 
t + τ, and let 𝐹𝑅,𝑡 represent the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of 𝑅𝑡+𝜏 conditional upon 
the set of information available at time t. Then, 𝐹𝑅,𝑡
−1 represents the inverse function of 𝐹𝑅,𝑡. 
Given this, the VaR of a firm’s return as of time t with a time horizon τ and at (1 − 𝛼) 
confidence level can be estimated as follows: 
𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡(𝛼, 𝜏) = −𝐹𝑅,𝑡
−1(𝛼)                                                          (2) 
Unlike normal VaR, the semi-parametric Cornish-Fisher VaR (𝑉𝑎𝑅𝐶𝐹) considers higher 
moments in the return distribution, thus relaxing the normality assumption. The Cornish and 
Fisher (1938) approximation incorporates higher moments (skewness and kurtosis) into the 
estimation process and, thus, accounts for non-normality in the return distribution. Zangari 
(1996) is the first to introduce this in his study that estimates the VaR of option portfolios. The 
justification behind the use of this formula is that any distribution can be approximated with 
these known moments, in terms of any other given distribution (Johnson et al. 1994, Jaschke, 
2002). Thus, we use 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝐶𝐹
8 to accommodate non-symmetrical and fat-tailed returns 
distribution. The fourth order Cornish and Fisher (1938) expansion for 𝛼 percentile of (𝑅 −
𝜇)/𝜎 is shown in equation (2), while equation (3) defines the Cornish-Fisher VaR (𝑉𝑎𝑅𝐶𝐹).  
Ω(𝛼) = 𝑍(𝛼) +
1
6
(𝑍(𝛼)2 − 1)𝑆 +
1
24
(𝑍(𝛼)3 − 3𝑍(𝛼))𝐾 −
1
36
(2𝑍(𝛼)3 − 5𝑍(𝛼))𝑆2      (3) 
                                                 
8 We use VaR and VaRCF interchangeably in this manuscript. 
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𝑉𝑎𝑅𝐶𝐹 =  −(𝜇 + Ω(𝛼) × 𝜎)                                                               (4) 
where 𝜎 is the standard deviation, μ is the average return, S is the measure of skewness, K is 
the excess kurtosis of past n-month daily returns, (1 − 𝛼) is the confidence level, and 𝑍(𝛼) is 
the critical value obtained from the standardised normal distribution.9  
Expected Shortfall: Although VaR is the maximum loss that can take place over a defined 
time horizon and confidence level, there still exists a very small probability that a loss greater 
than VaR may be experienced. Thus, VaR does not reveal any information about the size of 
the loss in the event when that level is breached. Expected Shortfall (ES) provides this 
information. It is the conditional expected loss that is greater than or equal to the VaR. ES 
expressed in terms of return rather than dollar amount is formulated as follows: 












                                                     (5) 
Here, 𝑅𝑡+𝜏 represents a firm’s return in the time period 𝑡, and 𝑡 + 𝜏 and 𝑓𝑅,𝑡 denotes the 
conditional probability density function (PDF) of 𝑅𝑡+𝜏. 𝐹𝑅,𝑡 is the conditional CDF of 𝑅𝑡+𝜏 
conditional upon the information set available at time 𝑡, 𝐹𝑅,𝑡
−1 represents the inverse function of 
𝐹𝑅,𝑡 , and (1 − 𝛼) is the confidence level. Artzner et al. (1999) provide the theoretical argument 
that VaR is inferior to ES as a risk measure. They argue that, unlike VaR, ES possesses 
mathematical properties like continuity and subadditivity which are desirable to a coherent 
                                                 
9Note that standard deviation is always positive, while the original VaR and ES are usually negative. To avoid 
confusion, the original VaR and ES numbers are multiplied by −1 in equations (3) and (4). Therefore, the VaR 
and ES numbers presented in this paper are usually positive. 
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measure of risk. We use Cornish-Fisher VaR (𝑉𝑎𝑅𝐶𝐹) calculated using equations (3) and (4) 
to estimate Expected Shortfall, denoted as 𝐸𝑆𝐶𝐹.
10 
4. Data and Covariates 
This section presents discussion on our sources of data and choice of covariates used in this 
study to perform required empirical analysis.  
4.1 Data 
Unlike several others (e.g. Chava and Jarrow, 2004), we do not try to predict the financial 
distress event over the next month or quarter. We believe that an efficient distress prediction 
model should work as an Early Warning System (Edison, 2003) and should signal any adverse 
distress event well in advance. This may provide sufficient time to avert or manage the 
forthcoming crisis. Thus, to predict the financial distress over the next one-year horizon, our 
empirical analysis employs annual firm-level accounting and market data of the United States 
firms from the Compustat database. We consider a relatively long analysis period from 1990 
to 2016. We also limit our sample to firms which are publicly-traded either on AMEX, 
NASDAQ or NYSE stock exchanges only. Transportation, Communications & Public Utilities, 
Finance, Insurance & Real Estate, and Public Administration firms have been excluded from 
our analysis (see Table 1). 
 [Insert Table 1 Here] 
4.2 Covariates 
Dependent Variable: We use the definition of financial distress proposed in Section 2 as 
the binary dependent variable for this study. 
                                                 
10 We use ES and ESCF interchangeably in this manuscript. 
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Independent Variables: A large volume of empirical literature has evolved over time 
which efficiently addresses the issues pertaining to prediction of corporate bankruptcy. 
However, the default prediction models gravitate toward the use of accounting variables (e.g. 
Altman, 1968, Ohlson, 1980) or market information to predict firms’ insolvency hazard (e.g. 
Bharath and Shumway, 2008). The market-based approach of modelling default risk has 
become popular since their commercial introduction by KMV, CreditMetrics and others. 
Hillegeist et al. (2004) report that market-based structural models perform better than popular 
accounting-based models, in particular the Altman Z-score (Altman, 1968) and Ohlson O-score 
(Ohlson, 1980) models.  
In a similar study, Das et al. (2009) report that their distress prediction models, built 
using accounting metrics and market metrics, respectively, exhibit very similar classification 
performances. Models which employ both accounting and market information substantially 
outperform both accounting and market-based models, suggesting that accounting and market 
information are complementary to each other. Findings of other related studies (see, among 
others, Agarwal and Taffler, 2008; Trujillo-Ponce et al. 2014) also support the findings of Das 
et al. (2009). Considering the above arguments, we use accounting and market information to 
develop our distress prediction models.  
In particular, we employ all eight (three accounting-based and five market-based) 
measures of bankruptcy employed by Campbell et al. (2008) to predict the bankruptcy of US 
firms, as they report that this set of covariates outperforms other standard sets of covariates 
employed in prior studies. We supplement this with two additional covariates, financial 
expenses to sales (FES) and tax-to-market valued total assets (TMTA), as they exhibit 
significant explanatory power and very high average marginal effects in several recent studies 
on SMEs financial distress (e.g. Gupta et al. 2018). Furthermore, we also test the marginal 
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predictive ability of tail risk measures discussed in Section 3, i.e. VaR and ES. Detailed 
definitions of financial covariates are as follows (see Table 2 for complete list of covariates 
along with their respective Compustat data items): 
I. Total liabilities to Market-valued Total Assets (TLMTA), calculated as: 
𝑇𝐿𝑀𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡
(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡)
 
Here a Market-valued Total Asset (MTA) is the sum of the market value of a firm’s equity 
and its total liabilities. In case of missing values of Total Liabilities, MTA is equal to the 
firm’s equity, and vice-versa. 
II. Cash and short-term assets to Market-valued Total Assets (CMTA), calculated as: 
𝐶𝑀𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡
(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡)
 
III. Weighted average of Net Income to Market-valued Total Assets (NIMTAAVG) over the 











where   
𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡
(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡)
 
Following Chen and Hill (2013), we modify Campbell et al.'s (2008) measure of average 
NIMTA to allow for the fact that we employ annual, rather than quarterly, accounting measures. 
Missing values of ANIMTA are replaced with the cross-sectional mean of NIMTA. 
IV. Weighted average of monthly log excess return relative to value-weighted S&P 500 
return over the previous 12-month period (EXRETAVG), calculated as: 
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(𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡−1 + ⋯ + ∅
11𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡−12) 
Where; 
𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔(1 + 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡) − 𝑙𝑜𝑔(1 + 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑆&𝑃 500,𝑡) 
Missing values of AMEXRET are replaced with the cross-sectional mean of MEXRET. 
V. Annualised standard deviation of a firm’s daily log returns over the previous three 
months (SIGMA), estimated as: 












2  represents the log returns of firm i on the day k, and N represents the number of days 
in the three-month estimation window. Here, following Campbell et al. (2008), we use a proxy 
centred around zero rather than a three months’ rolling mean.  
VI. Firm’s Market-to-book ratio (MB) 
VII. Log of price per share winsorized above $15 (PRICE) 
VIII. Logarithm of each firm’s size relative to S&P 500 market capitalisation (RSIZE), 
calculated as: 
𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆&𝑃 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑡
) 





X. Tax to Market-Valued Total Assets (TMTA), calculated as: 
𝑇𝑀𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑡
(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡)
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Healthy firms are expected to pay higher taxes due to higher business volume in comparison 
to distressed firms and, hence, a negative relationship is expected between TMTA and financial 
distress likelihood. Further, following the suggestion of Cohen et al. (2003), we adjust the book 
value of equity to avoid the influence of outliers. Specifically, we add 10% of the difference 
between the market value and the book value of equity to the book value of equity,11 thus 
increasing book values that are relatively very small and probably wrongly measured. This 
ultimately prevents outliers when book equity is used in the denominator when calculating 
financial ratios. For observations which still exhibit negative book value of equity after this 
adjustment, we replace negative book values with positive $1 to ensure that market-to-book 
value ratios for all observations are positive. Further, we restrict the range of all the covariates 
within 5th and 95th percentiles to limit the influence of any outliers.  
Control Variables: To control the volatility in the macroeconomic environment affecting 
specific industrial sectors, we calculate a measure of industry risk (INDRISK) as the financial 
distress rate (number of firms experiencing the event of interest in the respective industrial 
sector in a given year/total number of firms in that industrial sector in that year) in each of the 
seven industrial sectors in a given year. Higher values indicate a higher risk of financial 
distress, and vice versa. 
[Insert Table 2 Here]  
5. Empirical Methods 
5.1 Panel Logistic Regression 
Although we see a significant rise in the popularity of hazard models in modelling bankruptcy 
or financial distress events, in line with the findings of Gupta et al. (2018) we use panel logistic 
                                                 
11 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠(𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑)𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 0.1(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡) 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2847422 
22 | P a g e  
 
regression with random effects to establish our empirical validation. Gupta et al. (2018) argue 
that the discrete-time hazard model with logit link is essentially a panel logistic model that 
controls for firms’ age. Thus, we assume that marginal probability of firms’ financial distress 
over the next year follows a logistic distribution that is estimated as follows: 
𝑃(𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 1) =
1
1 + exp (−𝛼 − 𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1)
                                                 (7) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm is in financial distress in year t, and 
𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 is a vector of explanatory variables known at the end of the previous year. To capture 
any duration dependency, we use the natural logarithm of firms’ annual age12 (AGE) as a 
control variable in our multivariate models. Additionally, since our panel regression analyses 
use lagged covariates (t – 1), any potential endogeneity problem is expected to be mitigated, as 
lagged explanatory variables and dependent variables have a low likelihood of being jointly 
determined (Berger and Bouwman, 2013).  
However, Reed (2015) raise concern on this widespread practice of dealing with potential 
simultaneity, and argue that associated estimates may still remain inconsistent and hypothesis 
testing may be invalid. Rather they suggest an alternative, is to use lagged values of the 
endogenous variable in instrumental variable estimation. However, to the best of our 
knowledge, programming codes required to perform such statistical estimations are currently 
available only for linear regression specifications. Since we use non-linear panel logistic 
specification, we are at a disadvantage to act upon this valuable suggestion. But, to be mindful, 
we also report regression estimates of our main model using t – 2 and t – 3 lagged covariates. 
It is unlikely that the dependent and independent variables are simultaneously determined two 
or three years ahead in advance. Thus, significance of t – 2 and t – 3 lagged covariates shall 
                                                 
12 We proxy a firm’s age as the earliest year for which financial information for that firm is available in the 
Compustat database. 
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imply absence of any severe endogeneity bias in our regression estimates arising due to reverse 
causality.   
5.2 Summary Statistics and Correlations 
To get an initial understanding about the variability of our covariates, we report descriptive 
statistics for financially distressed and non-distressed/healthy groups of firms. Table 3 provides 
an overview of mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum of all covariates 
used in our study. Columns 1 and 5 present the list of covariates, while columns 2 and 6 list 
names of descriptive measures. The remaining columns report descriptive measures for 
financially distressed (columns 3 and 7) and non-distressed (columns 4 and 8) groups of firms. 
Descriptive measures of the vast majority of covariates are as per our expectation and without 
any extreme variability.  
The mean/median of covariates we report are very similar to those reported by Campbell 
et al. (2008) in their study, with some differences due to the data period and different definition 
of the default event. We expect the mean/median of the covariates that are positively related to 
the insolvency/distress risk to be higher for the distressed group than for the group without 
distress (see, for example, variable FES in Table 3). Contrarily, we expect the mean/median of 
the covariates that are negatively related to the insolvency/distress risk to be lower for the 
distressed groups than for the group without distress (see, for example, variable NIMTAAVG 
in Table 3). However, we also see some exceptions. The mean value of TLMTA for the 
distressed group is lower than for the non-distressed group of firms, implying that financially 
distressed firms have lower total liabilities. This is contrary to our traditional understanding, 
where we expect firms in financial distress to have higher liabilities compared to their total 
assets. Similarly, the mean value of CMTA for the distressed group is higher than for the non-
distressed group, implying that financially distressed firms have higher cash reserves. This is 
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contrary to intuition, where we expect financially distressed firms to have liquidity problems 
and, hence, lower reserves of cash and short-term investments. Also, the mean market-to-book 
(MB) ratio, which is expected to be lower for the distressed group of firms than its non-
distressed counterpart, is actually higher. This may suggest active demand of distressed stocks, 
which consequently pushes their stock price higher. These contrary revelations might affect the 
sign of respective regression coefficients.  
 [Insert Table 3 Here] 
A comparison of the distressed and non-distressed groups also reveals expected 
differences in Table 3. For example, distressed firms make mean loss of about 18%, compared 
with non-distressed firms that make mean loss of only about 1.9%, as lower mean of net income 
relative to market value of total assets shown by NIMTAAVG. The mean volatility of 
distressed firms is quite high at 80%, relative to only 55% of non-distressed firms, as shown 
by SIGMA. Distressed firms are relatively small (RSIZE) and have a much lower mean log 
price per share (PRICE), and lower returns (EXRETAVG) compared to their non-distressed 
counterpart. Similar to Campbell et al. (2008), the mean of market-to-book (MB) ratio of 
financially distressed firms is slightly higher, because the book value of their equity erodes due 
to frequent losses. This does not seem to be reflected in the market value of the firms because 
of the proactive nature of stock markets. 
A closer look at extreme measures generated using three-month, six-month, one-year, 
three-year and five-year daily returns, and sixty-month monthly returns (i.e. VaR and ES) 
reveal that distressed firms have higher values compared to non-distressed firms. This is to be 
expected, as distressed firms tend to exhibit extreme movements. VaR is the loss that will not 
exceed from that level with a certain confidence interval during a certain period of time. The 
higher magnitude reflects the higher probability of loss. For example, in Table 3 the mean 
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VAR3M1 of financially distressed firms is 13%. It means that we are 99% confident that the 
mean loss from financial distressed firms will not exceed 13% during a period of 3 months. 
Similarly, the mean VAR5Y5 of non-distressed firms is 5.37%. It means that we are 95% 
confident that the mean loss from the firms that are not financially distressed will not exceed 
5.37% during a period of 5 years. 
On the other hand, expected shortfall is the expected loss conditional upon that the loss 
is greater than a certain threshold. For example, in Table 3 the mean ES3M1 of financially 
distressed firms is 21.03%. It means that the mean loss of financially distressed firms will be 
21.03% during a period of 3 months with the assumption that the loss is greater than 99% of 
the loss distribution. Similarly, the mean ES5Y5 of non-distressed firms is 8.47%.  It means 
that the mean loss of firms that are not financially distressed will be 8.47% during a period of 
5 years months with the assumption that the loss is greater than 95% of the loss distribution. 
Furthermore, the mean/median of downside measures with the 95% confidence interval 
are lower compared to the measures with the 99% confidence interval. This is also intuitive as, 
at the lower confidence level, the cut-off point at which the loss should not exceed should be 
lower in the case of VaR and, at the higher confidence level, the cut-off point should be higher. 
Similarly, the mean of the losses larger than VaR (i.e., ES) should be lower at lower confidence 
intervals and higher at higher confidence intervals. We also find intertemporal differences, 
especially at the 99% confidence interval. We see the mean/median of extreme measures at 
shorter rolling windows are less than those at longer rolling windows. However, at the 95% 
confidence interval, the mean/media of extreme measures is slightly higher.  
Panel A of Table 4 reports correlation among main (non-tail risk) covariates. As reported, 
most covariates show low to moderate correlation among each other. However, PRICE shows 
strong positive correlation with RSIZE (0.7168) and strong negative correlation with SIGMA 
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(-0.6121). Thus, we take into account the issues of multicollinearity while developing our 
multivariate models excluding tail risk measures. Subsequently, Panel B of Table 4 reports 
correlation of tail risk measures with main variables. As reported, most tail risk measures 
exhibit moderate to low correlation with main variables, except SIGMA. This is expected, as 
both of these are competing measures of firms’ stock price volatility. However, we address this 
issue effectively while developing multivariate models (see Section 5.4). 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
5.3 Univariate Regression and Average Marginal Effects 
Table 5 reports the univariate regression results of respective covariates. This table reports 
point estimates (β), standard errors (SE), z-statistics (Z) and average marginal effects (AME) 
in percentages.13 All financial ratios are highly significant at the 1% level of significance. MB 
negatively predicts the financial distress of firms, meaning that the stock market is already 
anticipating the financial distress, driving down the market value of equity and hence the 
market-to-book ratio. As explained above in the summary statistics, we find another 
counterintuitive result as CMTA positively predicts the likelihood of financial distress. 
Eight out of twelve covariates show AME of less than 5% with AME of TLMTA, MB, 
RSIZE and AGE even less than 1%. However, the other four covariates reported are highly 
significant predictors, with more than 5% AME. Two non-Campbell covariates, FES and 
TMTA, exhibit AME of around 5% and 30%, respectively. Among extreme risk measures, all 
are highly significant at the 1% level of significance. This implies that all extreme risk measures 
                                                 
13 In non-linear regression analysis, Marginal Effects are a useful way to examine the effect of changes in a given 
variable on changes in the outcome variable, holding other variables constant. These can be computed as marginal 
change (it is the partial derivative for continuous predictors) when a variable change by an infinitely small quantity 
and discrete change (for factor variables) when a variable change by a fixed quantity. The Average Marginal 
Effects (AME) of a given variable is the average of its marginal effects computed for each observation at its 
observed values. Alternatively, AME can be interpreted as the change in the outcome (financial distress = 1, in 
our case) probabilities due to unit change in the value of a given variable, provided other covariates are held 
constant. See Long and Freese (2014) for additional discussion on this topic. 
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can predict financial distress, but some of the measures have very low values of AME, which 
raises scepticism about their predictive power in the multivariate setup. We see intertemporal 
differences as longer horizon rolling estimates show more statistical and economic 
significance. For example, three-year and five-year VaR, estimated at the 5% level of 
significance, have the highest AME of 4.49% and 6.03%, respectively. Although the AME of 
ES is not as high as for the VaR, sixty-month ES estimated at the 5% level of significance have 
the highest AME of 1.78%. Among ES estimated at the 1% level of significance, five-year and 
sixty-month, ES have the AME of 1.39% and 1.66, respectively. This shows that its 
discriminatory power is sensitive to duration and the significance level of tail risk estimates.  
 [Insert Table 5 Here] 
5.4 Baseline Multivariate Model 
In order to test the marginal discriminatory power of downside risk measures, we first estimate 
the baseline multivariate model with all financial covariates, as they are all significant in the 
univariate analysis. However, considering that few cases of moderate to high correlation among 
covariates are reported in Table 4, we follow the method suggested by Gupta et al. (2018) while 
developing our baseline multivariate model. Primarily, this requires ranking of the covariates 
in univariate regression based on the magnitude of their respective AME and, then, introducing 
each variable at a time in the multivariate setup, in ascending order of their rank. Gupta et al. 
(2018) argue that the higher the value of AME, the higher the change in the predicted 
probability due to unit changes in the covariate’s value. Thus, to develop a parsimonious model, 
our priority should be include minimum number of covariates with highest explanatory 
power/AME.  Also, we exclude a covariate from the multivariate model if, when introduced: 
(i) it reverses the expected sign of any previously added covariate; (ii) it bears the opposite sign 
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to that expected; (iii) it bears the expected sign, but has a p-value greater than 0.10; and (iv) it 
makes a previously added covariate insignificant with a p-value greater than 0.10.  
This allows us to develop a parsimonious baseline multivariate model that excludes 
PRICE, RSIZE, TLMTA and MB.14 We also exclude SIGMA from our baseline model, as the 
purpose of this study is to report the comparative performance of several tail risk measures in 
comparison to SIGMA, which we do in the subsequent section. Finally, we include INDRISK 
and natural logarithm of firms’ annual age (AGE) as control variables in the model. As reported 
in column 2 of Table 6, we develop the final parsimonious baseline model with seven 
covariates, all of which are highly significant and retain their respective signs, as reported in 
Table 5. We therefore conclude that, all of these covariates are jointly significant in predicting 
the financial distress of US firms. Also, as reported in Figure 1, the within-sample and out-of-
sample area under ROC curves (AUROC15) of this model is about 92%, suggesting excellent 
performance of our baseline model in classifying financially distressed firms. 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 6 report regression estimates for t – 2 and t – 3 lagged 
covariates of the main multivariate model reported in column 2 of Table 6. Except for the 
insignificance of EXRETAVG in t – 3, all financial covariates are highly significant in 
explaining a firm’s likelihood of experiencing financial distress in time t. This suggest strong 
intertemporal explanatory power of our model, with excellent classification performance of 
around 90% (see Figure 1).  This also implies, absence of any severe endogeneity bias in our 
                                                 
14 PRICE makes EXRETAVG insignificant, hence removed; RSIZE makes EXRETAVG insignificant, hence 
removed; TLMTA makes EXRETAVG insignificant, hence removed; and the coefficient of MB is positive, thus 
removed. 
15 The higher the AUROC, the better the prediction model. Please see Gupta et al. (2018) for additional discussion 
on this. For out-of-sample validation, we first estimate models using observations until the year 2011, and, using 
these estimates, we predict financial distress probabilities for the year 2012; we then include 2012 in the estimation 
sample and predict distress probabilities for 2013 and so on until the year 2016. We then use these predicted 
probabilities from the year 2012 through 2016 to estimate out-of-sample AUROC. 
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regression estimates due to reverse causality, as it is unlikely that the dependent and 
independent variables are simultaneously determined two or three years ahead in advance. 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
5.5 Multivariate Models with Risk Measures 
In order to test the marginal discriminatory power of tail risk measures in comparison to 
SIGMA, we re-estimate the baseline multivariate model with t – 1 lagged covariates (reported 
in column 2 of Table 6), supplemented with tail risk measures and report the results in Table 7 
and 8. Rows 3 to 7 in Table 7 and Table 8 report regression estimates for respective risk 
measures as listed in the first row of columns 2 to 14. LR Chi2, in the seventh row of column 
(1), is the chi-square for likelihood ratio test that compares the log likelihood of the baseline 
model supplemented with risk variables with the log likelihood of the baseline model, and tests 
whether this difference is statistically significant. To capture any variations that may arise due 
to the difference in significance levels of tail risk estimates, we estimate separate models 
employing tail risk measures estimated at 1% and 5% significance levels. Furthermore, we 
estimate separate multivariate models for daily three-month, six-month, one-year, three-year 
and five-year, and monthly sixty-month tail risk estimates to account for any intertemporal 
differences that may exist. Following Liang and Park (2010), we compare these models with 
our baseline multivariate model, supplemented with SIGMA as the risk measure. 
We estimate all multivariate models using our proposed definition of financial distress 
as defined in Section 2. Table 7 reports our multivariate regression results with VaR measures. 
The first column gives the names of the covariates. Column (2) reports estimates with SIGMA 
as the risk measure. Columns (3) to (8) report respective regression estimates employing tail 
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risk measured at the 99% confidence interval. Columns (9) to (14) report the same, but for tail 
risk measures estimated using the 95% confidence interval. 
Table 7 reveals intertemporal differences, as short-duration rolling estimates of VaR 
measures are insignificant in predicting firms’ likelihood of experiencing financial distress. As 
we measure the extreme downside risk, it might be that short-duration rolling estimates do not 
have enough observations (Huang et al. 2012);16 therefore, long-duration rolling estimates 
perform better in predicting the financial distress of firms. The multivariate models with five-
year VaR measured at the 95% confidence interval (VAR5Y5) is the best, as it shows the 
highest value of AME (8.19%) in comparison to other significant risk measures, and the highest 
value of LR Chi2 (31.77). The baseline model with SIGMA as a measure of risk is also 
statistically significant with LR Chi2 of 7.50; however, the AME is very low at 0.45%. Other 
significant downside risk measures are five-year and sixty-month VaR measured at the 99% 
confidence level and three-year and sixty-month VaR measured at the 95% confidence level.17 
Subsequently, we repeat this multivariate analysis with ES as the risk measure and report 
the results in Table 8. Similar to multivariate regression results with VaR, we find intertemporal 
differences in that the longer-duration rolling estimates of ES perform better in predicting the 
financial distress of firms. However, with ES we find that five-year ES measured at the 99% 
confidence interval performs better (with the LR Chi2 of 23.61) than the five-year ES measured 
at the 95% confidence interval. The only exception is the sixty-month ES measured at the 95% 
confidence interval that significantly predicts financial distress likelihood of firms. Since ES is 
the mean of the losses greater than VaR, the mean of the losses is lower at the 95% confidence 
interval because lower values reduce the mean of the losses. The mean is higher at the 99% 
                                                 
16 While measuring ES and TR, Bali et al. (2009) also use a longer rolling window of 100 days compared to 
shorter windows for measuring VaR.  
17 Three-month VAR measured at the 99% level of significance and three-month and six-month VAR measured 
at 95% level of significance also marginally significance with the reverse sign. 
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confidence interval and, therefore, we find stronger results for five-year ES measured at the 
99% confidence interval. However, VaR is simply a cut-off point and the cut-off point at the 
99% confidence interval covers the cut-off point at the 95% confidence interval. Therefore, we 
find stronger results for five-year VaR measured at the 95% confidence interval. Other ES 
measure that significantly predict the financial distress likelihood of firms is three-year ES 
measures at the 99% confidence interval. Our baseline model with SIGMA as a measure of risk 
also significantly explains the financial distress of firms, but shows lower values of AME and 
LR Chi2 than ES5Y1. The AME of ES3Y1 are also lower than the AME of ES5Y1. Overall, as 
the superiority is ES over VaR is well-documented in the literature, we conclude that five-year 
and sixty-month ES measured at the 99% confidence interval (ES5Y1) are superior to SIGMA 
(higher AME than SIGMA) and other competing tail risk measures.  
[Insert Tables 7 and 8 Here] 
6. Multivariate Models with Thresholds 
Conditions 1, 2 and 3 of our definition of financial distress presented in Section 2 emphasise 
only on the decline in respective values in the past two consecutive years. One might argue that 
the decline should be significant enough to threaten firms’ degree of solvency. Thus, imposing 
a threshold (a decline of X% or higher) might appear reasonable. Addressing this concern 
relating to model calibration or stress-testing in our existing framework is relatively 
straightforward. However, imposing such threshold will alter the distress status of a firm and, 
thus, needs to be based upon the risk appetite of the decision-maker. Imposing 0% threshold 
will imply most conservative behaviour or lowest risk appetite, while higher values will imply 
higher risk appetites. For a given threshold, this will also lead to decline in number of distressed 
firms in the sample, which will keep decreasing with increasing threshold values.  
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To investigate the effect of imposing such threshold on our distress definition, and its 
subsequent impact on the performance of the main distress prediction model (presented in 
column 2 of Table 6), we impose further restrictions on our proposed definition of financial 
distress and report the results in Table 9.  In particular, we report results obtained from 
arbitrarily imposing 10%, 20% and 30% threshold levels respectively on conditions 1, 2 and 3. 
For instance, a 10% threshold implies - Condition 1: There is negative growth in the AMV of 
the firm in years t – 1 and t – 2, and this decline in AMV is at least 10% or higher in both these 
respective years; Condition 2: the firm’s EBITDA is less than financial expenses in the years t 
– 1 and t – 2, and this shortfall in earnings in at least  10% or higher in both these respective 
years; and Condition 3: the firm’s OCF is less than its financial expenses in the years t – 1 and 
t – 2, and this shortfall in OCF is at least 10% or higher in both these respective years. 
Subsequently we do the same for 20% and 30% threshold levels respectively. Although our 
choice of threshold levels is arbitrary, one might choose any threshold level subjected to their 
risk appetite, or any required combination of different thresholds in the same definition of 
financial distress. 
In order to compare the baseline multivariate model with the models with different 
thresholds, we first report the baseline model of Table 6 in column 2 of Table 9.  Columns 3 to 
5 of Table 9 report multivariate regression estimates for models with 10%, 20% and 30% 
threshold levels respectively. As we see in Table 9, all five financial covariates are highly 
significant and retain their respective expected signs at different threshold levels. This shows 
consistency of these covariates in identifying different intensities of financial distress. 
However, the AME of respective covariates is highest for the model without any threshold and 
declines gradually with increasing threshold levels (see Table 9). This implies that the 
explanatory power of covariates decreases with the increase in the intensity of financial 
distress. This appears reasonable as firms experiencing higher intensity of financial distress 
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makes the distress group of firms appear more homogeneous that their healthy counterparts. 
This is also supported from the fact that the number of financially distressed firms in our sample 
decreases with increasing threshold levels. From 1,219, it falls to - 696 with the imposition of 
10% threshold; 504 with the imposition of 20% threshold; and 350 with the imposition of 30% 
threshold. However, the R2 of these models stays around 32%, implying no loss in overall 
explanatory power of these models with increasing threshold levels. Additionally, we also see 
in Table 9 that the log-likelihood values of respective models increase with increasing threshold 
levels. This implies that the sample quality improves with increasing threshold levels.  
Overall, we find our proposed definition of financial distress is robust to varying 
intensities of distress, with positive association between the sample quality and threshold 
levels. 
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
7. Multivariate Models with Thresholds and Risk Measures 
In order to test whether our finding relating to the statistical significance of tail risk measures 
in explaining financial distress are robust to financial distress definitions of varying intensities, 
we re-estimate the multivariate models reported in Table 9 supplementing risk measures listed 
in Table 2 (see Tables 10 and 11)18.  
Similar to what we see in Table 7, we find that short-duration rolling estimates of VaR 
measures are insignificant in predicting firms’ likelihood of experiencing financial distress, 
whereas long-duration rolling estimates perform significantly better (see Table 10). Similar to 
our baseline results in Table 7, we find that multivariate models with five-year VaR estimate 
at the 95% confidence interval (VAR5Y5) is the best at all respective threshold levels of 10%, 
                                                 
18 Please note that, to save space we report only risk variables and models’ goodness of fit measures in these table. 
The statistical significance of unreported covariates remain identical to the one reported in Table 9. 
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20% and 30%, with the highest value of AME, and the highest value of LR Chi2. Models with 
SIGMA as a measure of risk are also statistically significant at all threshold levels but with 
lower AMEs. Our results are also robust for three-year (VAR3Y5) and sixty-month 
(VAR60M5) VaR estimates at the 95% confidence level, and for sixty-month (VAR60M1) 
VaR estimate at the 99% confidence level. However, five-year VaR estimate at the 99% 
confidence level (VAR5Y1) is significant only at 10% threshold level. Overall, these results at 
respective threshold levels are broadly identical to what we report in Table 7, with the only 
difference being insignificance of VAR5Y1 at 20% and 30% threshold levels. Additionally, as 
reported in the earlier section, here also we see decline in the AME of risk measure with 
increasing threshold levels. 
We repeat the above multivariate analysis with ES as the risk measure at three selected 
threshold levels of 10%, 20% and 30% respectively. We report our results in Table 10. At all 
threshold levels, our results are robust and are very similar to what we report in Table 8 without 
any threshold; with three-year, five-year and sixty-month ES estimates at the 99% confidence 
interval being significant predictor of financial distress. Similarly, at 95% confidence level, the 
only significant predictor is sixty-month ES (ES60M). These results are also similar to 
multivariate regression results with VaR, that, long-duration rolling estimates of ES perform 
better in predicting financial distress than its short-duration counterparts. Our baseline model 
with SIGMA as a measure of risk also significantly explain financial distress of firms at all 
threshold levels but show lower AME values. Additionally, as reported in the earlier section 
and similar to VaR, here also we see decline in the AME of respective ES measures with 
increasing threshold levels. 
Overall, our robustness checks substantiate our earlier conclusion, and show that our 
proposed definition of financial distress is consistent and robust. Because of the theoretical 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2847422 
35 | P a g e  
 
superiority of ES over VaR, we suggest using five-year or sixty-month ES estimates in 
predicting financial distress. 
[Insert Tables 10 and 11 Here] 
8. Conclusion 
Appropriate pricing of credit risk is integral to maintaining sustainable and competitive lending 
practices. This also informs the estimation of capital reserves that lending institutions are 
required to maintain in proportion to their risk-weighted assets. Overestimation of credit risk 
will lead to higher capital reserves and, thus, an opportunity loss, whereas underestimation 
results in lower capital reserves, but may trigger large shortfalls and significant capital losses 
(see Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2013, for brief discussion). We contribute to this strand of literature 
by documenting the impact of tail risk measures on firms’ likelihood of financial distress. 
At first, we argue the need for a mechanism to identify firms in financial difficulties 
rather than waiting until they file for bankruptcy. Waiting until the bankruptcy filing might 
lead to significant erosion in firms’ value, losses to creditors and unfavourable business 
decisions. Thus, there is a need for an alternative mechanism to identify firms in financial 
difficulties and it would be appropriate to penalise them for getting close to questionable going-
concern status. As a consequence, we propose a definition of financial distress contingent upon 
firms’ earnings, financial expenses, market value and operating cash flow. Specifically,  we 
define a firm as financially distressed if it satisfies three simple conditions: (i) there is negative 
growth in the average market value (AMV) of the firm in years t – 1 and t – 2, where AMV the 
is geometrically declining weighted average of a firm’s monthly market values over the past 
twelve months; (ii) its earnings before interest tax depreciation and amortisation is less than its 
financial expenses in the years t – 1 and t – 2; and (iii) its operating cash flow is less than its 
financial expenses in the years t – 1 and t – 2.  
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Next, we hypothesise that more frequent extreme negative daily equity returns result in 
higher tail risk, and this subsequently increases firms’ likelihood of entering financial distress. 
Thus, we assess the marginal discriminatory power of tail risk measures, namely value-at-risk 
and expected shortfall, in predicting financial distress likelihood of United States publicly-
traded firms. Empirical results suggest that longer duration tail risk measures exhibit significant 
discriminatory powers. Our robustness checks substantiate these findings, and show that our 
proposed definition of financial distress is consistent and robust. Because of the theoretical 
superiority of ES over VaR, we suggest using five-year or sixty-month ES estimates in 
predicting financial distress. 
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Tables & Figures 
 
Table 1: Sample Industrial Classification 
Industry Code SIC Code Industry Included/Excluded 
1  < 1000 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing Included 
2 1000 to < 1500 Mining Included 
3 1500 to < 1800 Construction Included 
4 2000 to < 4000 Manufacturing Included 
5 5000 to < 5200 Wholesale Trade Included 
6 5200 to < 6000 Retail Trade Included 
7 7000 to < 8900 Services Included 
Excluded 4000 to < 5000 Transportation, Communications & Public Utilities Excluded 
Excluded 6000 to < 6800 Finance, Insurance & Real Estate Excluded 
Excluded 9100 to < 10000 Public Administration Excluded 
Notes: This table reports Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) of the United States firms. SIC Code is a four 
digit code that represents a given industrial sector. The last column reports the industrial sectors that we included 
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Table 2: Variable Description 
Variable Definition Compustat Data Item 
TLMTA Total liabilities to Market-valued Total Assets LT, PRCC_F, CSHO 
CMTA Cash and short-term assets to Market-valued Total Assets CHE, PRCC_F, CSHO, LT 
NIMTAAVG Weighted average of Net Income to Market-valued Total Assets over the previous three-year 
period 
NI, PRCC_F, CSHO, LT 
EXRETAVG Weighted average of monthly log excess return relative to value-weighted S&P 500 return over the 
previous 12-month period 
PRCCM, AJEXM, SPRTRN 
SIGMA Annualised standard deviation of a firm’s daily log returns over the previous three months  PRCCD, AJEXDI 
MB Firm’s Market-to-book ratio PRCC_F, CSHO, SEQ 
PRICE Log of price per share winsorized above $15 PRCC_F 
RSIZE Logarithm of each firm’s size relative to S&P 500 market capitalisation PRCC_F, CSHO, TOTVAL 
FES Financial Expense to Sale IE, SALE 
TMTA Tax to Market-valued Total Assets TXT, PRCC_F, CSHO, LT 
   
AGE Natural logarithm of firms’ annual age  
INDRISK Number of firms experiencing financial distress in respective industrial sectors in a given 
year/total number of firms in that industrial sector in that year  
   
VAR3M1 Value-at-Risk estimated using daily returns over past 3 months at 1% significance level PRCCD, AJEXDI 
VAR6M1 Value-at-Risk estimated using daily returns over past 6 months at 1% significance level PRCCD, AJEXDI 
VAR1Y1 Value-at-Risk estimated using daily returns over past 1 year at 1% significance level PRCCD, AJEXDI 
VAR3Y1 Value-at-Risk estimated using daily returns over past 3 years at 1% significance level PRCCD, AJEXDI 
VAR5Y1 Value-at-Risk estimated using daily returns over past 5 years at 1% significance level PRCCD, AJEXDI 
VAR60M1 Value-at-Risk estimated using monthly returns over past 5 years at 1% significance level PRCCM, AJEXDI 
   
VAR3M5 Value-at-Risk estimated using daily returns over past 3 months at 5% significance level PRCCD, AJEXDI 
VAR6M5 Value-at-Risk estimated using daily returns over past 6 months at 5% significance level PRCCD, AJEXDI 
VAR1Y5 Value-at-Risk estimated using daily returns over past 1 year at 5% significance level PRCCD, AJEXDI 
VAR3Y5 Value-at-Risk estimated using daily returns over past 3 years at 5% significance level PRCCD, AJEXDI 
VAR5Y5 Value-at-Risk estimated using daily returns over past 5 years at 5% significance level PRCCD, AJEXDI 
VAR60M5 Value-at-Risk estimated using monthly returns over past 5 years at 5% significance level PRCCM, AJEXDI 
   
ES3M1 Expected Shortfall estimated using daily returns over past 3 months at 1% significance level PRCCD, AJEXDI 
ES6M1 Expected Shortfall estimated using daily returns over past 6 months at 1% significance level PRCCD, AJEXDI 
ES1Y1 Expected Shortfall estimated using daily returns over past 1 year at 1% significance level PRCCD, AJEXDI 
ES3Y1 Expected Shortfall estimated using daily returns over past 3 years at 1% significance level PRCCD, AJEXDI 
ES5Y1 Expected Shortfall estimated using daily returns over past 5 years at 1% significance level PRCCD, AJEXDI 
ES60M1 Expected Shortfall estimated using monthly returns over past 5 years at 1% significance level  PRCCM, AJEXDI 
   
ES3M5 Expected Shortfall estimated using daily returns over past 3 months at 5% significance level PRCCD, AJEXDI 
ES6M5 Expected Shortfall estimated using daily returns over past 6 months at 5% significance level PRCCD, AJEXDI 
ES1Y5 Expected Shortfall estimated using daily returns over past 1 year at 5% significance level PRCCD, AJEXDI 
ES3Y5 Expected Shortfall estimated using daily returns over past 3 years at 5% significance level PRCCD, AJEXDI 
ES5Y5 Expected Shortfall estimated using daily returns over past 5 years at 5% significance level PRCCD, AJEXDI 
ES60M5 Expected Shortfall estimated using monthly returns over past 5 years at 5% significance level  PRCCM, AJEXDI 
Notes: This table reports the set of accounting- and market-based covariates that we use in our empirical analysis. 
The first column lists names of covariates, while the second column provides their respective definitions. Financial 
information and stock price information are sourced from the Compustat database, covering an analysis period 
from 1990 to 2016. The third column states the specific Compustat data items that we use to calculate respective 
covariates. Value-at-Risk (VAR) and Expected Shortfall (ES) are estimated at 1% and 5% significance levels 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
TLMTA    MB    
 Mean 0.2816 0.3440  Mean 3.1660 2.4520 
 Median  0.2078 0.2970  Median 2.6513 2.0025 
 SD 0.2284 0.2407  SD 2.0469 1.5767 
 Minimum 0.0352  0.0352  Minimum 0.6588 0.6588 
 Maximum 0.8446 0.8446  Maximum 6.6199 6.6199 
CMTA    PRICE    
 Mean 0.2025 0.1129  Mean 1.0365 2.1295 
 Median 0.1681 0.0648  Median 0.8755 2.6301 
 SD 0.1489 0.1249  SD 0.8451 0.7971 
 Minimum 0.0028 0.0027  Minimum 0.1178 0.1178 
 Maximum 0.4510 0.4510  Maximum 2.7081 2.7081 
NIMTAAVG    RSIZE    
 Mean -0.1812 -0.0192  Mean -11.9120  -10.2861 
 Median -0.1780 0.0192  Median -12.0701  -10.3200 
 SD 0.1046 0.0987  SD 1.3269  1.8228 
 Minimum -0.3039 -0.3039  Minimum -13.4014  -13.4014 
 Maximum 0.0750 0.0750  Maximum -6.8133  -6.8133 
EXRETAVG    FES    
 Mean -0.0071 -0.0079  Mean 0.0445 0.0242 
 Median -0.0056 -0.0051  Median 0.0170 0.0112 
 SD 0.0572 0.0430  SD 0.0516 0.0333 
 Minimum -0.0984 -0.0984  Minimum 0.0000 0.0000 
 Maximum 0.0712 0.0712  Maximum 0.1290 0.1290 
SIGMA    TMTA    
 Mean 0.8002 0.5529  Mean 0.0001 0.0115 
 Median 0.7433 0.4734  Median 0.0000 0.0090 
 SD 0.3059 0.2993  SD 0.0079 0.0159 
 Minimum 0.1962 0.1963  Minimum -0.0174 -0.0174 
 Maximum 1.2851 1.2851  Maximum 0.0494 0.0494 
AGE    RISKFD    
 Mean 2.4457 2.3227  Mean 0.0337 0.0146 
 Median 2.3979 2.3979  Median 0.025 0.0094 
 SD 0.5469 1.0483  SD 0.0227 0.0164 
 Minimum 1.3863 0.0000  Minimum -0.0009 0.0000 
 Maximum 4.1897 4.2047  Maximum 0.1667 0.1667 
VAR3M1    VAR3M5    
 Mean 0.1300 0.0880  Mean 0.0788 0.0544 
 Median 0.0961 0.0672  Median 0.0636 0.0438 
 SD 0.1106 0.0779  SD 0.0552 0.0424 
 Minimum 1.0000 1.0000  Minimum 0.6277 1.0000 
 Maximum 0.0033 0.0001  Maximum 0.0019 4.5e-05 
VAR6M1    VAR6M5    
 Mean 0.1550 0.1058  Mean 0.0785 0.0557 
 Median 0.1111 0.0798  Median 0.0654 0.0460 
 SD 0.1343 0.0942  SD 0.0513  0.0400 
 Minimum 1.0000 1.0000  Minimum 0.4815 1.0000 
 Maximum 0.0004 8.2e-05  Maximum 0.0005 2.4e-06 
VAR1Y1    VAR1Y5    
 Mean 0.1867 0.1243  Mean 0.0761 0.0546 
 Median 0.1354 0.0922  Median 0.0648 0.0464 
 SD 0.1566 0.1139  SD 0.0464 0.0363 
 Minimum 1.0000 1.0000  Minimum 0.4388 1.0000 
 Maximum 0.0052 4.2e-05  Maximum 0.0003 1.1e-05 
VAR3Y1    VAR3Y5    
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 Mean 0.2829 0.1689  Mean 0.0808 0.0537 
 Median 0.2009 0.1202  Median 0.0717 0.0475 
 SD 0.2240 0.1595  SD 0.0450  0.0323 
 Minimum 1.0000 1.0000  Minimum 0.3717 1.0000 
 Maximum 0.0480 0.0023  Maximum 0.0031 2.3e-05 
VAR5Y1    VAR5Y5    
 Mean 0.3475 0.1945  Mean 0.0760 0.0530 
 Median 0.2408 -0.1366  Median 0.0708 0.0477 
 SD 0.2605 0.1832  SD 0.0373  0.0300 
 Minimum 1.0000 1.0000  Minimum 0.3197 1.0000 
 Maximum 0.0510 0.0011  Maximum 5.4e-05 2.6e-07 
VAR60M1    VAR60M5    
 Mean 0.5797 0.3758  Mean 0.3792 0.2416 
 Median 0.5418 0.3223  Median 0.3542 0.2121 
 SD 0.2339 0.2137  SD 0.1442  0.1325 
 Minimum 1.0000 1.0000  Minimum 1.0000 1.0000 
 Maximum 0.0628 0.0004  Maximum 0.0248 0.0006 
ES3M1    ES3M5    
 Mean 0.2103 0.1287  Mean 0.1297 0.0817 
 Median 0.1243 0.0841  Median 0.0900 0.0609 
 SD 0.2277  0.1555  SD 0.1188 0.0761 
 Minimum 1.0000 1.0000  Minimum 1.0000 1.0000 
 Maximum 0.0248 0.0007  Maximum 0.0048 7.2e-05 
ES6M1    ES6M5    
 Mean 0.2250 0.1389  Mean 0.1293 0.0870 
 Median 0.1439 0.0987  Median 0.0914 0.0649 
 SD 0.2173 0.1405  SD 0.1157 0.0828 
 Minimum 1.0000 1.0000  Minimum 1.0000 1.0000 
 Maximum 0.0009 0.0001  Maximum 0.0084 2.4e-06 
ES1Y1    ES1Y5    
 Mean 0.2717 0.1660  Mean 0.1215 0.0861 
 Median 0.1842 0.1191  Median 0.0886 0.0656 
 SD 0.2307 0.1572  SD 0.1163 0.0815 
 Minimum 1.0000 1.0000  Minimum 1.0000 1.0000 
 Maximum 0.0003 4.2e-05  Maximum 0.0034 5.5e-05 
ES3Y1    ES3Y5    
 Mean 0.3686 0.2044  Mean 0.1154 0.0861 
 Median 0.2828 0.1497  Median 0.0860 0.0674 
 SD 0.2487 0.1778  SD 0.1133 0.0878 
 Minimum 1.0000 1.0000  Minimum 1.0000 1.0000 
 Maximum 0.0034 2.9e-05  Maximum 0.0002  2.3e-05 
ES5Y1    ES5Y5    
 Mean 0.3968 0.2201  Mean 0.1151 0.0847 
 Median 0.3028 0.1603  Median 0.0851 0.0666 
 SD 0.2605  0.1897  SD 0.1273 0.0929 
 Minimum 1.0000  1.0000  Minimum 1.0000 1.0000 
ES60M1    ES60M5    
 Mean 0.6828 0.4607  Mean 0.5275 0.3375 
 Median 0.6620 0.4004  Median 0.4783 0.2862 
 SD 0.2407  0.2481  SD 0.2207 0.2006 
 Minimum 1.0000  1.0000  Minimum 1.0000 1.0000 
 Maximum 0.1531 0.0363  Maximum 0.1236 0.0310 
Notes: This table provides descriptive statistics for covariates listed in columns (1) and (5). To facilitate 
comparison, descriptive measures are reported separately for financially distressed (columns 3 and 7) and healthy 
(columns 4 and 8) groups. SD is standard deviation. Except EXRETAVG, two groups mean comparison test for 
respective covariates are statistically significant at 1% significance level.  
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Table 4: Correlation Matrix 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Panel A: Correlation among Main Variables 
TLMTA (1) 1.0000          
CMTA (2) -0.2351 1.0000         
ANIMTA (3) -0.0311 -0.3074 1.0000        
AMEXRET (4) -0.2141 -0.1351 0.1993 1.0000       
SIGMA (5) 0.0758 0.1975 -0.4696 -0.2595 1.0000      
MB (6) -0.3104 -0.1883 -0.1360 0.2007 0.0156 1.0000     
PRICE (7) -0.2216 -0.2598 0.5217 0.3033 -0.6121 0.1109 1.0000    
RSIZE (8) -0.1516 -0.2596 0.3490 0.2140 -0.5189 0.2372 0.7168 1.0000   
FES (9) 0.3265 -0.0744 -0.2872 -0.0836 0.1448 0.1631 -0.1706 -0.0569 1.0000  
TMTA (10) -0.0907 -0.1179 0.4489 0.0757 -0.2525 -0.1162 0.2874 0.1751 -0.2394 1.0000 
Panel B: Correlation among Main and Tail Risk Variables 
VAR3M1 -0.0860 -0.1368 0.3489 0.2263 -0.7607 -0.0195 0.4636 0.3784 -0.1142 0.1768 
VAR6M1 -0.0743 -0.1441 0.3521 0.2774 -0.6806 -0.0341 0.4320 0.3654 -0.1042 0.1799 
VAR1Y1 -0.0490 -0.1538 0.3482 0.2566 -0.5946 -0.0485 0.4035 0.3484 -0.1042 0.1797 
VAR3Y1 -0.0166 -0.1604 0.3474 0.1556 -0.4454 -0.0835 0.3493 0.3092 -0.1253 0.2015 
VAR5Y1 -0.0096 -0.1620 0.3427 0.1250 -0.3836 -0.0943 0.3341 0.2976 -0.1300 0.1997 
VAR60M1 -0.0050 -0.2147 0.4741 0.1698 -0.5438 -0.0934 0.3840 0.3304 -0.1650 0.2747 
           
VAR3M5 -0.1004 -0.1573 0.4021 0.2570 -0.8464 -0.0058 0.5315 0.4274 -0.1309 0.2031 
VAR6M5 -0.1012 -0.1661 0.4210 0.3059 -0.8335 -0.0072 0.5475 0.4454 -0.1286 0.2134 
VAR1Y5 -0.0858 -0.1746 0.4390 0.2813 -0.8154 -0.0179 0.5688 0.4677 -0.1306 0.2260 
VAR3Y5 -0.0419 -0.1740 0.4525 0.1842 -0.7576 -0.0453 0.5664 0.4866 -0.1378 0.2545 
VAR5Y5 -0.0049 -0.1803 0.4413 0.1511 -0.7144 -0.0579 0.5598 0.4961 -0.1275 0.2538 
VAR60M5 0.0118 -0.2385 0.5485 0.1994 -0.6432 -0.1059 0.4541 0.3896 -0.1764 0.3065 
           
ES3M1 -0.0500 -0.1115 0.2676 0.1478 -0.5639 -0.0311 0.3263 0.2806 -0.0924 0.1423 
ES6M1 -0.0667 -0.1336 0.3214 0.2064 -0.5859 -0.0330 0.3920 0.3392 -0.0994 0.1646 
ES1Y1 -0.0543 -0.1514 0.3463 0.1939 -0.5485 -0.0371 0.4193 0.3713 -0.1116 0.1820 
ES3Y1 -0.0185 -0.1747 0.4060 0.1491 -0.5130 -0.0851 0.4375 0.3889 -0.1460 0.2257 
ES5Y1 -0.0042 -0.1760 0.3908 0.1331 -0.4524 -0.0981 0.4085 0.3632 -0.1499 0.2231 
ES60M1 -0.0070 -0.2074 0.4590 0.1627 -0.5459 -0.0915 0.4087 0.3651 -0.1633 0.2727 
           
ES3M5 -0.0749 -0.1414 0.3582 0.2088 -0.7499 -0.0251 0.4491 0.3687 -0.1142 0.1777 
ES6M5 -0.0718 -0.1337 0.3369 0.2546 -0.6519 -0.0254 0.4096 0.3444 -0.0935 0.1678 
ES1Y5 -0.0503 -0.1346 0.3129 0.2390 -0.5811 -0.0280 0.3782 0.3143 -0.0823 0.1580 
ES3Y5 -0.0083 -0.1067 0.2509 0.1199 -0.4184 -0.0413 0.2733 0.2345 -0.0713 0.1434 
ES5Y5 0.0072 -0.0931 0.2046 0.0757 -0.3091 -0.0432 0.2137 0.1907 -0.0582 0.1177 
ES60M5 -0.0009 -0.2105 0.4795 0.1747 -0.5582 -0.0986 0.4074 0.3497 -0.1637 0.2756 
Notes: This table reports correlation among the set of covariates. Panel A displays correlations among main 
variables suggested by Campbell et al. (2008) to which we supplemented FES and TMTA. Panel B provides 
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Table 5: Univariate Regression 
Variables Coefficient Standard Error z-statistics AME % Rank 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
TLMTA 1.2407a 0.1443 8.60 0.41a 8 
CMTA 5.0517a 0.2107 23.98 2.78a 5 
NIMTAAVG -9.9555a 0.2553 -38.99 -7.20a 2 
EXRETAVG -11.7030a 0.6643 -17.62 -6.71a 3 
SIGMA 1.7099a 0.0952 17.97 1.05a ---- 
MB -0.0822a 0.0208 -3.95 -0.03a 9 
PRICE -1.8438a 0.0843 -38.21 -1.47a 6 
RSIZE -1.0774a 0.0376 -28.69 -0.62a 7 
FES 10.6394a 0.7990 13.32 4.80a 4 
TMTA -53.7919a 2.7701 -19.42 -30.07a 1 
AGE 0.5636a 0.0465 12.12 0.14a ---- 
INDRISK 22.6630a 1.3730 16.51 8.72a ---- 
      
VAR3M1 2.1574a 0.2666 8.09 1.05a ---- 
VAR6M1 1.7075a 0.2256 7.57 0.84a ---- 
VAR1Y1 1.4859a 0.1900 7.82 0.72a ---- 
VAR3Y1 1.7141a 0.1404 12.21 0.91a ---- 
VAR5Y1 2.1107a 0.1274 16.57 1.20a ---- 
VAR60M1 2.8442a 0.1303 21.83 1.87a ---- 
      
VAR3M5 4.1758a 0 .4938 8.46 2.04a ---- 
VAR6M5 4.5172a 0.5386 8.39 2.26a ---- 
VAR1Y5 5.4346a 0.6092 8.92 2.70a ---- 
VAR3Y5 9.1312a 0.7207 12.67 4.49a ---- 
VAR5Y5 12.2205a 0.8433 14.49 6.03a ---- 
VAR60M5 4.4384a 0.1906 23.29 2.99a  
      
ES3M1 1.2239a 0.1327 9.22 0.59a ---- 
ES6M1 1.5158a 0.1447 10.48 0.76a ---- 
ES1Y1 1.5925a 0.1355 11.74 0.81a ---- 
ES3Y1 2.2144a 0.1239 17.87 1.13a ---- 
ES5Y1 2.3195a 0.1236 18.77 1.39a ---- 
ES60M1 2.5213a 0.1231 20.47 1.66a ---- 
      
ES3M5 2.5530a 0.2506 10.19 1.25a ---- 
ES6M5 1.9224a 0.2429 7.91 0.91a ---- 
ES1Y5 1.5578a 0.2548 6.11 0.72a ---- 
ES3Y5 0.8846a 0.2630 3.36 0.39a ---- 
ES5Y5 1.2673a 0.2349 5.39 0.56a ---- 
ES60M5 2.7446a 0.1319 20.81 1.78a  
Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1% (5%) [10%] level (two-sided test). This table reports univariate regression 
estimates of respective covariates using our proposed definition of financial distress as the dependent variable. 
AME is average marginal effects in percentages. Column (6) reports the ranking of the main variables based on 
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Table 6: Baseline Multivariate Regression Models 
Variables  (T – 1) (T – 2) (T – 3) 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) 
TLMTA                                    
 β ----- ----- ----- 
 SE ----- ----- ----- 
CMTA                                      
 β 3.9430a 3.3276a 1.8415a 
 SE 0.2480 0.2598 0.2618 
 AME 5.1450 a 4.4193 a 2.7795 a 
NIMTAAVG     
 Β -9.6073a -11.7358a -9.3950a 
 SE 0.3362 0.3711 a 0.3333 
 AME -12.5361 a -15.5853 -14.1800 a 
EXRETAVG                                     
 Β -3.6941a -12.6168a -0.5815 
 SE 0.7194 0.7968 -0.8200 
 AME -4.8202 a -16.7559 a -0.8776 
SIGMA     
 Β ----- ----- ----- 
 SE ----- ----- ----- 
MB     
 Β ----- ----- ----- 
 SE ----- ----- ----- 
PRICE     
 Β ----- ----- ----- 
 SE ----- ----- ----- 
RSIZE     
 Β ----- ----- ----- 
 SE ----- ----- ----- 
FES                                      
 Β 7.0887a 3.8007a 3.2327a 
 SE 0.7688 0.8400 0.8155 
 AME 9.2497 a 5.0475 a 4.8792 a 
TMTA                                                   
 Β -26.3068a -22.0542a -23.7398a 
 SE 2.9939 2.9722 2.9429 
 AME -34.3264 a -29.2894 a -35.8306 a 
AGE                                      
 Β 0.3017 a 0.1799a -0.2586a 
 SE 0.0558 0.0522 0.0459 
 AME 0.3937 a 0.2389 a -0.3903 a 
INDRISK                                                     
 Β 18.7770a -2.5321 a -5.6689a 
 SE 1.6898 2.2349 2.0998 
 AME 24.5011 a -3.3628 a -8.5562 a 
Model’s goodness of fit and prediction performance measures 
Chi2              2236.11a 2242.69a 1817.70a 
Log likelihood            -4150.7302 -3741.3455 -4182.0543 
R2  0.3917 0.3536 0.2508 
AUROC-W  0.9240 0.9431 0.9026 
AUROC-H  0.9193 0.9428 0.8995 
N = 0+1  59,602 53,003 48,010 
N = 1    1,160 1,225 1,168 
Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1% (5%) [10%] level (two-sided test). This table reports multivariate regression 
estimates that employ only main variable discussed in Section 4.2 for T-1 (column 2), T-2 (column 3) and T-3 
(column 4) lagged covariates. The baseline multivariate model in column 2 is developed following the method 
suggested by Gupta et al. (2018) (see section 5). TLMTA, MB, RSIZE, PRICE and SIGMA are excluded from 
the model for the reasons mentioned in section 5 (related to the expected coefficient sign and the p-value, or the 
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strong correlation with other covariates). N = 0 + 1 represent the total number of firm-year observations for the 
two groups of firms between 1990 and 2016. N = 1 is the number of observations for the financially distressed 
firms. This table also reports the chi-square, the likelihood ratio and the coefficient of determination (McKelvey 
& Zavoina's R2) to measure the model’s goodness of fit. AWROC-W is within-sample area under ROC curve and 
AWROC-H is for hold-out sample. 
 
 
Figure 1: Area under ROC Curves 
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Table 7: Multivariate Regression Models with VaR 
Variables SIGMA VAR3M1 VAR6M1 VAR1Y1 VAR3Y1 VAR5Y1 VAR60M1 VAR3M5 VAR6M5 VAR1Y5 VAR3Y5 VAR5Y5 VAR60M5 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)  (12) (13) (14) 
Risk Measure              
β  0.3446a -0.6634c -0.4875 -0.2922 0.2044 0.5732a 0.6907a -1.3422c -1.7765b -1.3476 2.8789a 6.5853a 1.3093a 
SE 0.1251 0.3682 0.3045 0.2512 0.1726 0.1503 0.1667 0.7093 0.7879 0.9011 1.0149 1.1449 0.2819 
AME 0.4495a -0.8697c -0.2649 -0.3773 0.2662 0.7437a 0.8826a -1.7443c -2.2969b -1.7376 3.6191a 8.1862a 1.6723a 
LR Chi2 7.5000a 3.4400c 2.6500 1.3800 1.3800 14.100a 16.9500a 3.7300c 5.3000b 2.3100 7.7200a 31.7700a 21.2300a 
CMTA              
β 4.0596a 3.8820a 3.9273a 3.9347a 3.9766a 3.9924a 3.9923a 3.8381a 3.8347a 3.9314a 4.2236a 4.2015a 4.01309a 
SE 0.2504 0.2522 0.2511 0.2512 0.2492 0.2511 0.2511 0.2524 0.2547 0.2555 0.2591 0.2610 0.2819 
NIMTAAVG              
β -9.1909a -9.8214a -9.8028a -9.7502a -9.5584a -9.1629a -9.1629a -9.8917a -9.9514a -9.8193a -9.4009a -9.1925a -8.9686a 
SE 0.3721  0.3551 0.3542 0.3536 0.3463 0.3609 0 .3608 0.3599 0.3655 0.3672 0.3638 0.3620 0.3706 
EXRETAVG              
β -3.4113a -3.8365a -3.8214a -3.7963a -3.5371a -3.4006a -3.4005a -3.7818a -3.8942a -3.9179a -3.3195a -3.4141a -3.2654a 
SE 0.7217 0.7318 0.7280 0.7283 0.7233 0.7234 0.7234 0.7293 0.7351 0.7375 0.7486 0.7464 0.7238 
FES               
β 7.1077a 7.0961a 7.1864a 7.0929a 7.0809a 6.9784a 6.9783a 7.0919a 7.1285a 7.1382a 7.4160a 7.4645a 6.9472a 
SE 0.7692 0.7760 0.7733 0.7769 0.7735 0.7786 0.7786 0.7754 0.7789 0.7844 0.8043 0.8126 0.7784 
TMTA               
β -25.7929a -26.0233a -25.9140a -25.9666a -26.1026a -25.5957a -25.5957a -26.0049a -25.4098a -25.8002a -24.5883a -23.8689a -25.4876a 
SE 3.0013 3.0130 3.0053 3.0144 3.0070 3.0193 3.0192 3.0107 3.0224 3.0310 3.0441 3.0585a 3.0212a 
AGE               
β 0.3235a 0.2862a 0.2985a 0.2920a 0.3038a 0.3375a 0.3375a 0.2854 0.2831a 0.2815a 0.3275a 0.3673a 0.3610a 
SE 0.0568 0.0565 0.0563 0.0565 0.0563 0.0576 0.0576 0.0565 0.0568 0.0574 0.0591 0.0608 0.05858 
 RISK              
β 19.5882a 18.8046a 18.8477a 18.8847a 18.7999a 19.4803a 19.4802a 18.8948a 18.8983a 19.0909a 20.2097a 21.0505a 19.8380a 
SE 1.7130 1.7131 1.7045 1.7078  1.6952 1.7022 1.7022 1.7141 1.7249 1.7286 1.7444 1.7411 1.7033 
Model’s goodness of fit and prediction performance measures 
chi2 2232.06a 2209.66a 2234.30a 2208.21a 2226.58a 2184.84a 2184.84a 2212.63a 2198.73a 2186.41a 2126.69a 2083.52a 2185.96a 
Log likelihood -4128.5475 -4032.4688 -4063.9586 -4066.6788 -4120.0273 -4084.6001 -4084.6001 -4053.8316 -4010.7991 -3976.7497 -3878.275 -3821.1612 -4089.0856 
R2 0.3299 0.3267 0.3280 0.3257 0.3270 0.3305 0.3305 0.3252 0.3291 0.3257 0.3264 0.3301 0.3311 
N = 0+1 59,601 58,659 57,698 57,869 58,175 58,185 58,185 57,415 58,507 57,019 56,332 55,968 58,258 
N = 1 1,215 1,183 1,196 1,194 1,213 1,205 1,205 1,176 1,118 1,167 1,140 1,124 1,206 
Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1% (5%) [10%] level (two-sided test). This table reports multivariate regression estimates obtained by supplementing the baseline model 
reported in Table 6 with SIGMA and VaR measures. Estimates of the risk measures as listed in columns (2) to (14) are reported in rows (4) to (7). Column (2) reports regression 
estimates with SIGMA being the risk measure. Columns (3) to (8) report respective multivariate regression estimates supplementing VaR as the risk measure (three-month, 
six-month, one-year, three-year and five-year daily returns and sixty-month monthly return) at the 95% confidence interval, and columns (9) to (12) report the same at 99% 
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confidence interval. The chi-square for likelihood ratio test (LR Chi2) reported in row (7) of column (1) tests the existence of any significant difference between the log 
likelihood of the baseline model supplemented with risk variable, and log likelihood of baseline model. The last five rows of this table provide goodness of fit measures. Chi-
square (Chi2), likelihood ratio, and the coefficient of determination (McKelvey & Zavoina's R2) of respective multivariate models with respective risk variables are reported in 
the first three of the last five rows. N = 0 + 1 represents the total number of firm-year observations for the two groups of firms between 1990 and 2016. N = 1 is the number of 
firm-year observations for financially distressed group of firms. 
 
Table 8: Multivariate Regression Models with ES 
Variables SIGMA ES3M1 ES6M1 ES1Y1 ES3Y1 ES5Y1 ES60M1 ES3M5 ES6M5 ES1Y5 ES3Y5 ES5Y5 ES60M5 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)  (12) (13) (14) 
Risk Measure              
β  0.3446a 0.1632 0.0947 0.2682 0.6783a 0.7360a 0.6769a 0.0173 -0.2254 -0.2083 -0.4769 0.2433 0.7264a 
SE 0.1251 0.1636 0.1840 0.1667 0.1536 0.1489 0.1558 0.3286 0.3265 0.3348 0.3512 0.2876 0.1724 
AME 0.4495a 0.2124 0.1238 0.3472 0.8813a 0.9523a 0.8715a 0.0225 -0.2698 -0.4941 -0.6016 0.3077 0.9334a 
LR Chi2 7.500a 0.9800 0.2600 2.5400 18.7800 a 23.6100a 18.7700a 0.0000 0.4800 0.3900 1.9400 0.7000 17.4300a 
CMTA              
β 4.0596a 3.9649a 3.9807a 3.9924a 3.9973a 3.9547a 3.9882a 3.9634a 3.9270a 4.0290a 4.0523a 4.0146a 3.9931a 
SE 0.2504 0.2492 0.2493 0.2503 0.2491 0.2496 0.2498 0.2496 0.2504 0.2510 0.2548 0.2547 0.2501 
NIMTAAVG              
β -9.1909a -9.5841a -9.5781a -9.4613a -9.2437a -9.2368a -9.0949a -9.6406a -9.7323a -9.7013a -9.7663a -9.6136a -9.1244a 
SE 0.3721 0.3433 0.3486 0.3499 0.3490 0.3476 0.3592 0.3487 0.3498 0.3478 0.3483 0.3461 0.3589 
EXRETAVG              
β -3.4113a -3.5959 a -3.7082a -3.095a -3.3643a -3.4783a -3.4067a -3.6033a -3.5967a -3.5680a -3.5561a -3.6227a -3.4280a 
SE 0.7217 0.7226 0.7230 0.7255 0.7199 0.7185 0.7192 0.7226 0.7242 0.7260 0.7415 0.7398 0.7197 
FES               
β 7.1077a 7.1047a 7.1388a 7.0795a 6.8732a 6.7409a 6.9813a 7.0960a 7.1997a 7.1340a 7.4299a 7.3272a 6.9324a 
SE 0.7692 0.7708 0.7701 0.7742 0.7734 0.7768 0.7737 0.7710 0.7729 0.7769 0.7924 0.7929 0.7752 
TMTA               
β -25.7929a -26.0431a -26.1313a -26.1694a -25.9099a -25.6348a -25.3468a -26.1866a -25.9843a -26.0025a -25.1342 a -25.0697a -25.5604a 
SE 3.0013 3.0031 3.0021 3.0124 3.0168 3.0206 3.0065 3.0024 3.0063 3.0078 3.0406 3.0360 3.0091 
AGE               
β 0.3235a 0.3026a 0.3023a 0.3027a 0.3176a 0.3196a 0.3427a 0.2993a 0.3047a 0.3027a 0.2874a 0.2970a 0.3420a 
SE 0.0568 0.0562 0.0563 0.05630 0.0565 0.0566 0.0574 0.0562 0.0563 0.0565 0.0623 0.0576 0.0574 
 RISK              
β 19.5882a 18.9429a 19.1011a 19.1011a 18.9332a 18.9319a 19.3062a 18.8269a 18.8518a 18.7541a 16.2860a 19.3562a 19.3286a 
SE 1.7130 1.6969 1.6992 1.6992 1.6965 1.6971 1.7005 1.6975 1.6991 1.7042 2.3852 1.7211 1.6997 
 Model’s goodness of fit and prediction performance measures  
chi2 2232.06a 2229.36a 2238.87a 2211.94a 2223.00a 2211.40a 2196.33a 2227.25a 2216.58a 2214.75a 1938.18a 2142.31a 2198.83a 
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Log likelihood -4128.5475 -34122.0715  -4110.1135 -4096.2486 -4114.9963 -4115.2167 -4110.5026 -4126.6347 -4104.8703 -4077.1546 -3784.0133  -3955.3607 -4111.3689 
R2 0.3299 0.3267 0.3282 0.3269 0.3290 0.3287 0.3313 0.3263 0.3256 0.3259 0.3259 0.3218 0.3297 
N = 0+1 58,386 58,236 58,131 58,138 58,311 58,331 58,343 58,261 58,148 57,743 58,201 56,891 58,348 
N = 1 1,215 1,213 1,210 1,202 1,213 1,214 1,212 1,214 1,206 1,201 1,108 1,156 1,212 
Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1% (5%) [10%] level (two-sided test). This table reports multivariate regression estimates obtained by supplementing the baseline model 
reported in Table 6 with SIGMA and ES measures. Estimates of the risk measures as listed in columns (2) to (14) are reported in rows (4) to (7). Column (2) reports regression 
estimates with SIGMA being the risk measure. Columns (3) to (8) report respective multivariate regression estimates supplementing ES as the risk measure at the 95% 
confidence interval, and columns (9) to (14) report the same at 99% confidence interval. The chi-square for likelihood ratio test (LR Chi2) reported in row (7) of column (1) 
tests the existence of any significant difference between the log likelihood of the baseline model supplemented with risk variable, and log likelihood of baseline model. The 
last five rows of this table provide goodness of fit measures. Chi-square (Chi2), likelihood ratio and the coefficient of determination (McKelvey & Zavoina's R2) of respective 
multivariate models with respective risk variables are reported in the first three of the last five rows. N = 0 + 1 represents the total number of firm-year observations for the two 
groups of firms between 1990 and 2016. N = 1 is the number of firm-year observations for financially distressed group of firms. 
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Table 9: Baseline Multivariate Model at different threshold levels 
Variables  Main (0% Threshold) 10% Threshold 20% Threshold 30% Threshold 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CMTA      
 β 3.9430a 2.908a 2.9629a 3.1287a 
 SE 0.2480 0.3063 0.3432 0.4006 
 AME 5.1450a 2.4574a 1.9692a 1.4829a 
NIMTAAVG      
 β -9.6073a -9.1548a -9.5856a -10.3909a 
 SE 0.3362 0.4180 0.4787 0.5766 
 AME -12.5361a -7.7360a -6.3709a -4.9247a 
EXRETAVG                                      
 Β -3.6941a -4.5370a -4.3899a -4.1111a 
 SE 0.7194 0.9034 1.0367 1.2236 
 AME -4.8202a -3.8334a -2.9177a -1.9484a 
FES                                    
 Β 7.0887a 11.0839a 9.5835a 8.3311a 
 SE 0.7688 0.8878 0.9944 1.1687 
 AME 9.2497a 9.3660a 6.3695a 3.9485a 
TMTA                                               
 Β -26.3068a -22.8561a -19.1492a -13.6018a 
 SE 2.9939 3.8382 4.4013 5.1473 
 AME -34.3264a -19.3139a -12.7271a -6.4465a 
AGE                                 
 Β 0.3017a 0.1957a 0.1071  0.0378 
 SE 0.0558 0.0682 0.0779 0.0934 
 AME 0.3937a 0.1653a 0.0712 0.0179 
INDRISK                                                      
 Β 18.7770a 192664a 19.4829a 20.9762a 
 SE 1.6898 2.0835 2.3834 2.7946 
 AME 24.5011a 16.2805a 12.9489a  9.9415a 
Model’s goodness of fit and prediction performance measures 
Chi2  2236.11a             1506.61a 1196.95a 903.11a 
Log likelihood  -4150.7302           -2730.9877 -2101.0535 -1532.2126 
R2  0.3263 0.3211 0.3262 0.3340 
N = 0+1  59,691 58,995 59,187 59,341 
N = 1  1,219  696 504 350 
Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1% (5%) [10%] level (two-sided test). Column 2 reports the baseline multivariate 
regression estimates for t – 1 lagged covariates, similar to the model reported in column 2 of Table 6. Columns 3, 
4 and 5 report results obtained from arbitrarily imposing 10%, 20% and 30% threshold levels respectively on 
conditions 1, 2 and 3 of our proposed financial distress definition (see section 6 for details). All regression 
estimates are reported for t – 1 lagged covariates. N = 0 + 1 represent the total number of firm-year observations 
for the two groups of firms between 1990 and 2016. N = 1 is the number of firm-year observations for financially 
distressed group of firms. This table also reports the chi-square, the likelihood ratio and the coefficient of 
determination (McKelvey & Zavoina's R2) to measure the model’s goodness of fit.  
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Table 10: Multivariate Regression Models at different thresholds with VaR 
Panel A: 10 % Threshold Estimates 
Risk Measures SIGMA VAR3M1 VAR6M1 VAR1Y1 VAR3Y1 VAR5Y1 VAR60M1 VAR3M5 VAR6M5 VAR1Y5 VAR3Y5 VAR5Y5 VAR60M5 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10)  (11) (12) (13) (14) 
β 0.3724a -0.4628 -0.3947 -0.3527 0.2804 0.6081a 1.1308a -1.0255 -1.0302 0.1388 5.01948a 8.9486a 2.0060a 
SE 0.1550 0.4366 0.3639 0.3054 0.2045 0.1774 0.2010 0.8398 0.9206 1.0121 1.1076 1.2545 0.3270 
AME 0.3158a -0.3932  -0.3330 -0.2940 0.2363 0.5113a 0.9312a -0.8713 -0.8612 0.1161 4.0686a 7.3382a 1.6607a 
LR Chi2 5.7000b 1.1600 1.2100 1.3800 1.8400 11.3200a 31.2100a 1.5500 1.2900 0.0200 18.7400a 47.2600 36.4100a 
Model’s goodness of fit and prediction performance measures 
Chi2 1508.75a 1493.39a 1491.64a 1479.09a 1500.05a 1491.80a 1464.23a 1498.72a 1472.06a 1467.99a 1438.60a 1432.81a 1475.48a 
Log likelihood -2716.0946 -2669.8853 -2677.1974 -2671.3670 -2710.5895 -2709.0528 -2680.1741 -2680.6081 -2658.3682 -2619.9340 -2527.0812 -2490.9328 -2684.0485 
R2 0.3249 0.3208 0.3215 0.3189 0.3212 0.3224 0.3266 0.3221 0.3192 0.3190 0.3241 0.3327 0.3268 
N = 0+1 58,907 57,979 58,211 58,384 58,695 58,724 58,702 58,185 57,914 57,521 56,826 56,452 58,775 
N = 1 694 680 683 679 693 694 688 684 677 665 646 640 689 
Panel B: 20 % Threshold Estimates 
β 0.4900a -0.4411 -0.6696 -0.5887c -0.0557 0.2963 1.0120a -0.8340 -1.1595 0.1232 4.3923a 8.7093a 1.8207a 
SE 0.1761 0.4899 0.4258 0.3555 0.2378 0.2031 0.2280 0.9344 1.0463 1.1439 1.2448 1.4112 0.3652 
AME 0.3263 -0.2924 -0.4399 -0.3806c -0.0369 0.1965 0.6509a -0.5564 -0.7582 0.0794 2.7035a 5.3361a 1.1833a 
LR Chi2 7.6600a 0.8400 2.6300 2.9100c 0.0600 2.0800 19.4700a 0.8200 1.2700 0.0100 11.3000a 35.3800a 24.0000a 
Model’s goodness of fit and prediction performance measures 
Chi2 1196.56a 1177.35a 1177.57a 1166.62a 1192.22a 1189.53a 1153.79a 1186.60a 1167.53a 1151.52a 1118.10 1099.30a 1168.44a 
Log likelihood -2084.8657 -2045.4045 -2045.3282 -2053.0042 -2086.1928 -2084.6411 -2057.9970 -2054.0931 -2031.8816 -2004.9210 -1946.1826 -1921.0403 -2062.0946 
R2 0.3322 0.3254 0.3261 0.3241 0.3266 0.3270 0.3312 0.3272 0.3242 0.3240 0.3288 0.3346 0.3316 
N = 0+1 59,099 58,169 58,403 58,571 58,886 58,916 58,893 58,376 58,104 57,707 57,001 56,625 58,966 
N = 1 502 490 491 492 502 502 497 493 487 479 471 467 498 
Panel C: 30 % Threshold Estimates 
β 0.3990c -0.4631 -0.9538c -0.5987 -0.1221 0.3454 1.2543a -0.9422 -1.5617 0.0318 4.2145a 8.9213a 2.1655a 
SE 0.2089 0.5694 0.5175 0.4129 0.2782 0.2345 0.2680 1.0952 1.2463 1.3375 1.4047 1.5886 0.4192 
AME 0.1891c -0.2167 -0.4466c 0.2788 -0.0577 0.1628 0.5748a -0.4430 0.7290 0.0147 0.1879a 3.9878a 0.9998a 
LR Chi2 3.6200c 0.6900 3.7300c 2.2400 0.2000 2.1100 21.7700a 0.7700 1.6500 0.0000 8.0800a 29.1900a 25.6100a 
Model’s goodness of fit and prediction performance measures 
Chi2 901.62a 884.89a 888.47a 889.10a 899.74a 895.38a 877.62a 888.14a 883.17a 869.39a 857.57a 849.02a 888.23a 
Log likelihood -1517.1064 -1493.5122 -1492.1717 -1499.9776 -1517.2735 -1515.9201 -1500.6078 -1498.4049 -1481.1960 -1463.0975 -1434.2777 -1408.3170 -1499.4390 
R2 0.3398 0.3327 0.3331 0.3334 0.3349 0.3353 0.3416 0.3337 0.3316 0.3322 0.3362 0.3450 0.3419 
N = 0+1 59,253 58,317 58,552 58,719 59,040 59,070 59,043 58,526 58,252 57,852 57,140 56,763 59,117 
N = 1 348 342 342 344 348 348 347 343 339 334 332 329 347 
Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1% (5%) [10%] level (two-sided test). This table reports multivariate regression estimates obtained by supplementing models estimated at 
different threshold levels of conditions 1, 2 and 3 of our proposed financial distress definition (see section 6 for details) with SIGMA and VaR measures. Estimates of the risk 
measures as listed in columns (2) to (14) are provided in rows (4) to (7). Column (2) reports regression estimates with SIGMA being the risk measure. Columns (3) to (8) report 
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respective multivariate regression estimates supplementing VaR as the risk measure (three-month, six-month, one-year, three-year and five-year daily returns and sixty-month 
monthly returns) at the 95% confidence interval and columns (9) to (14) report the same at 99% confidence interval. The chi-square for likelihood ratio test (LR Chi2) reported 
in row (7) of column (1) tests the existence of any significant difference between the log likelihood of the baseline model supplemented with risk variable, and log likelihood 
of baseline model. The last 5 rows of respective panels provide goodness of fit measures. Chi-square (Chi2), log likelihood and the coefficient of determination (McKelvey & 
Zavoina's R2) of respective multivariate model with respective risk variables are reported in first three of last five rows. All regression estimates are reported for t – 1 lagged 
covariates. To save space, we do not report the baseline covariates of Table 9 in this table. N = 0 + 1 represent the total number of firm-year observations for the two groups of 




Table 11: Multivariate Regression Models at different thresholds with ES 
10 % Threshold Estimates 
Risk Measures SIGMA ES3M1 ES6M1 ES1Y1 ES3Y1 ES5Y1 ES60M1 ES3M5 ES6M5 ES1Y5 ES3Y5 ES5Y5 ES60M5 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10)  (11) (12) (13) (14) 
β 0.3724a -0.0509 -0.1867 005307 0.7653a 0.81118a 1.0569a -0.1283 -0.1199 0.1434 -0.0045 0.4964 1.1631a 
SE 0.1550 0.2069 0.2311 0.2600 0.1829 0.1759 0.1938 0.4012 0.3876 0.3861 0.3872 0.3170 0.2038 
AME 0.3158a -0.04230  -0.1576 0.0443 0.7653a 0.6807a 0.8826a -1.0819 -1.0061 0.1204 -0.0036 0.4137 0.9674a 
LR Chi2 5.7000b 1.0600 0.6600 0.0700 16.6900a 20.3900a 29.6200a 0.1000 0.1000 0.1400 0.0000 2.3100 31.5600a 
Model’s goodness of fit and prediction performance measures 
Chi2 1508.75a 1503.03 a 1501.64a 1483.50a 1497.98a 1488.17a 1478.02a 1503.58a 1494.30a 1492.68a 1461.82a 1462.74a 1481.95a 
Log likelihood -2716.0946 -2717.0580 -2712.8445 -2697.4317 -2705.2087 -2707.2534 -2694.5402 -2716.9205 -2706.4733 -2689.3026 -2591.0134 -2595.1436 -2693.6768 
R2 0.3249 0.3208 0.3213 0.3198 0.3228 0.3232 0.3311 0.3210 0.3192 0.3192 0.3193 0.3204 0.3275 
N = 0+1 58,907 58,755 58,648 58,654 58,831 58,851 58,863 58,781 57,914 58,257 57,627 57,388 58,868 
N = 1 694 694 693 686 693 694 692 694 677 687 660 659 692 
20 % Threshold Estimates 
β 0.4900a -0.0444 -0.1753 0.2059 0.6863a 0.6492a 0.9652a -0.1209 0.1899 0.2395 -0.5234 0.2915 1.0660a 
SE 0.1761 0.2322 0.2583 0.2285 0.2052 0.1981 0.2233 0.4476 0.4156 0.4257 0.4795 0.3682 0.2298 
AME 0.3263a -0.0294 -0.1157 0.1347 0.4544a 0.4291a 0.6295a -0.0800 0.1250 0.1577 -0.3280 0.1840 0.6960a 
LR Chi2 7.6600a 0.0400 0.4700 0.8000 10.6700a 10.3300a 18.7000a 0.0700 0.2100 0.3100 1.2800 0.6000 20.8600a 
Model’s goodness of fit and prediction performance measures 
Chi2 1196.56a 1193.69a 1189.37a 1179.15a 1189.81a 1183.88a 1166.31a 1194.27a 1184.98a 1182.21a 1146.37a 1135.97a 1173.36a 
Log likelihood -2084.8657 -2087.3259 -2083.2399 -2072.9820 -2082.3212 -2082.4929 -2069.5539 -2087.1803 -2076.3988 -2068.3888 -1985.8420 -1990.4561 -2068.5422 
R2 0.3322 0.3260 0.3260 0.3253 0.3280 0.3277 0.3353 0.3262 0.3253 0.3241 0.3248 0.3231 0.3321 
N = 0+1 59,099 58,947 58,840 58,843 59,022 59,043 59,055 58,973 58,856 58,447 57,808 57,570 59,060 
N = 1 502 502 501 497 502 502 500 502 498 497 479 477 500 
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30 % Threshold Estimates 
β 0.3990c -0.3343 -0.3030 0.1054 0.6213a 0.7005a 1.0475a -0.5214 -0.3611 0.0797 -0.4601 -0.1651 1.1884a 
SE 0.2089 0.2865 0.3051 0.2681 0.2397 0.2298 0.2677 0.5445 0.5262 0.5092 0.5499 0.4703 0.2689 
AME 0.189c -0.1570 0.1428 0.0497 0.2930a 0.3286a 0.4855a -0.2452 -0.1676 0.0372 -0.2053 -0.0754 0.5512a 
LR Chi2 3.6200c 1.4300 1.0200 0.1500 6.4300b 8.9300a 15.4300a 0.9600 0.4900 0.0200 0.7500 0.1300 18.9900a 
Model’s goodness of fit and prediction performance measures 
Chi2 901.62a 897.95a 898.80a 896.52a 899.25a 891.50a 878.39a 899.22a 888.47a 888.66a 866.12a 870.76a 883.40a 
Log likelihood -1517.1064 -1517.2659 -1516.1788 -1509.3053 -1515.0614 -1513.8117 -1506.6564 -1517.3928 -1509.0097 -1505.0721 -1454.9139 -1452.9582 -1504.9120 
R2 0.3398 0.3340 0.3347 0.3354 0.3360 0.3357 0.3450 0.3342 0.3325 0.3318 0.3313 0.3313 0.3413 
N = 0+1 59,253 59,101 58,993 58,994 59,176 59,197 59,208 59,127 59,009 58,599 57,952 57,714 59,213 
N = 1 348 348 348 346 348 348 347 348 345 345 335 333 347 
Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1% (5%) [10%] level (two-sided test). This table reports multivariate regression estimates obtained by supplementing models estimated at 
different threshold levels of conditions 1, 2 and 3 of our proposed financial distress definition (see section 6 for details) with SIGMA and ES measures. Estimates of the risk 
measures as listed in columns (2) to (14) are provided in rows (4) to (7). Column (2) reports regression estimates with SIGMA being the risk measure. Columns (3) to (8) report 
respective multivariate regression estimates supplementing ES as the risk measure (three-month, six-month, one-year, three-year and five-year daily returns and sixty-month 
monthly returns) at the 95% confidence interval and columns (9) to (14) report the same at 99% confidence interval. The chi-square for likelihood ratio test (LR Chi2) reported 
in row (7) of column (1) tests the existence of any significant difference between the log likelihood of the baseline model supplemented with risk variable, and log likelihood 
of baseline model. The last 5 rows of respective panels provide goodness of fit measures. Chi-square (Chi2), log likelihood and the coefficient of determination (McKelvey & 
Zavoina's R2) of respective multivariate model with respective risk variables are reported in first three of last five rows. All regression estimates are reported for t – 1 lagged 
covariates. To save space, we do not report the baseline covariates of Table 9 in this table. N = 0 + 1 represent the total number of firm-year observations for the two groups of 
firms between 1990 and 2016. N = 1 is the number of firm-year observations for financially distressed group of firms. 
